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THE CHRONIC FAILURE TO DISCIPLINE 
PROSECUTORS FOR MISCONDUCT: 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
THOMAS P. SULLIVAN* & MAURICE POSSLEY** 
 
While most prosecutors adhere to the maxim that their primary task is 
to obtain just results, there are some who violate their ethical responsibilities 
in order to rack up convictions.  This article describes the distressing, 
decades-long absence of discipline imposed on prosecutors whose knowing 
misconduct has resulted in terrible injustices being visited upon defendants 
throughout the country.  Many honorable lawyers have failed to speak out 
about errant prosecutors, thus enabling their ethical breaches.  The silent 
accessories include practicing lawyers and judges of trial and reviewing 
courts who, having observed prosecutorial misconduct, failed to take 
corrective action.  Fault also lies with members of attorney disciplinary 
bodies who have not investigated widely publicized prosecutorial 
misconduct. This article summarizes the rules requiring all members of the 
bar to report unethical conduct.  We focus particularly on lawyers who serve 
in prosecutors’ offices, defense lawyers, and trial and reviewing court judges 
and their lawyer clerks, each of whom has a personal, non-delegable 
responsibility to report their knowledge of ethical breaches to disciplinary 
authorities.   
In addition, the article identifies reforms to the justice system designed 
to reduce prosecutorial abuses: (1) substituting for the Brady rule a 
verifiable open-file pretrial discovery requirement on prosecutors; (2) 
instead of invoking harmless error, requiring reversal of convictions if 
 
* Partner, Jenner & Block, Chicago, 1954–present, except July 1977 to April 1981, when 
he served as United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.  Thanks to Jo Stafford 
and Ginger R. Wiley for their assistance in the preparation of this article. 
** Journalist and senior researcher for the National Registry of Exonerations. 
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serious prosecutorial misconduct is proven; (3) identifying errant 
prosecutors by name in trial and appellate opinions; (4) providing 
prosecutors with qualified instead of complete immunity from civil damages 
for misconduct; and (5) authorizing the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Inspector General to handle investigations of alleged misconduct by federal 
prosecutors. The article also proposes that attorney disciplinary bodies 
adopt changes designed to more effectively discover and sanction 
misbehaving prosecutors.  Lawyer organizations and bar associations are 
urged to speak out when prosecutors deviate from appropriate conduct, and 
law schools are encouraged to include instruction on ethical rules peculiar 
to the criminal practice.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The authors of this article have extensive experience with the criminal 
justice systems, state and federal. Possley is a Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist1 with more than forty years of experience and the co-author of two 
surveys, cited infra, which revealed extensive prosecutorial misconduct in 
Chicago and California that had gone unpunished.2 Sullivan has practiced law 
in Chicago for over sixty years, chiefly in civil and criminal litigation, 
including service for a brief period as a federal prosecutor. We believe that 
most prosecutors adhere to the precept that their primary function is not to 
obtain convictions, but to see that justice is done; hence, the threat of 
sanctions is not needed to persuade them to comply with their ethical 
obligations. Unfortunately, there are a few rogue prosecutors who flout the 
rules of professional conduct and bring our criminal justice system into 
 
1 The 2008 Pulitzer Prize Winners: Investigative Reporting, THE PULITZER PRIZES, 
http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2008-Investigative-Reporting (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).   
2 KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA, 1997–2009, A VERITAS INITIATIVE REPORT 16 
(2010), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ncip
pubs; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice 
to Win. Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial1-story.html.  
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disrepute. The writings cited in this article—which span four decades—have 
identified and bemoaned this problem, but few have attempted—as we do in 
this article—to set forth a comprehensive series of practical proposals 
designed to identify and weed out the small, but insidious, group of 
miscreants, and to prevent future acts of prosecutorial misconduct.3 
We have divided our article into three parts:4 Part I contains a review of 
the evidence that has accumulated over the past several decades and reveals 
an almost complete lack of discipline of errant prosecutors. Part II contains a 
summary of the rules that apply to all members of the bar, including judges, 
and require them to report serious lawyer misconduct to disciplinary bodies. 
In Part III, we set out our recommendations for reforms, which are directed 
to judges, prosecutors, state and federal disciplinary authorities and 
legislatures, organizations that promulgate codes of conduct for judges and 
lawyers, organizations that represent judges and lawyers, and law schools. 
I. LACK OF DISCIPLINE FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
The failure to punish prosecutors who engage in misconduct is not a 
recent phenomenon. To the contrary, it has been well known for many 
decades, as illustrated in the surveys and articles summarized below, 
prepared by those who have studied relevant cases and disciplinary systems.5 
We begin in Part A with a few of the many cases in which misconduct 
was discovered but went unpunished. In Part B we cite surveys and articles 
that have called attention to this situation. 
  
 
3 We do not mean to imply that violation of legal professional rules occurs only on the 
prosecution side of criminal prosecutions. There are of course defense lawyers who do not 
comply with the rules of professional conduct, and much contained in this article is applicable 
to them as well. 
4 To simplify, we have used the masculine pronoun throughout. 
5 Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently made these cogent 
observations: 
While most prosecutors are fair and honest, a legal environment that tolerates sharp prosecutorial 
practices gives important and undeserved career advantages to prosecutors who are willing to step 
over the line, tempting others to do the same. Having strict rules that prosecutors must follow will 
thus not merely avoid the risk of letting a guilty man free to commit other crimes while an innocent 
one languishes his life away, it will also preserve the integrity of the prosecutorial process by 
shielding principled prosecutors from unfair competition from their less principled colleagues. 
Hon. Alex Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxvi (2015) 
(forthcoming), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/06/Kozinski_Preface.pdf.  
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A. EXAMPLES OF CASES INVOLVING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
WITH NO RESULTING DISCIPLINE 
The reality of prosecutorial misconduct is best illustrated through the 
facts of specific cases, so we have gathered and summarized a few below.6 
In none of these cases was the prosecutor disciplined. 
After serving as a prosecutor in the Cuyahoga County District 
Attorney’s office in Cleveland, Ohio, for thirty years, Carmen Marino retired 
in 2002.7 Over those three decades, Marino prosecuted scores of cases and 
racked up many convictions. Marino attributed his success to jurors, who he 
said were inclined to trust law enforcement and distrust defendants who did 
not testify in their trials.8 Upon Marino’s retirement, the Cuyahoga County 
District Attorney began giving an annual award, christened the Carmen 
Marino Award, to a prosecutor in the office for “integrity and professionalism 
in the pursuit of justice.”9 
Six years later, however, the award was renamed Prosecutor of the Year 
Award because Marino’s name had come to represent the worst—not the 
best—attributes of a prosecutor.10 Many of the convictions he obtained 
unraveled because of his misconduct: failing to disclose key pieces of 
evidence to defendants before trial; allowing prosecution witnesses to lie at 
trial;11 and delivering improper, prejudicial closing arguments.12 
 
6 These cases are taken from the National Registry of Exonerations, maintained at the 
University of Michigan School of Law, which contains details of the cases involving more 
than 1,800 defendants whose convictions have been overturned. Many of the cases involve 
prosecutors who violated their ethical responsibilities, but in only a few were disciplinary 
measures taken. The National Registry of Exonerations, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Jun. 8, 2016).  
7 Regina Brett, County Prosecutor Bill Mason Should Retire Carmen Marino Award, 
PLAIN DEALER (Oct. 03, 2008, 8:29 P.M.), http://www.cleveland.com/brett/blog/index.ssf/
2008/09/regina_brett_county_prosecutor.html.  
8 William Dawson, in his book The Legal Matrix, quoted Marino discussing his success 
as a prosecutor: “Marino said it’s not difficult to win convictions in Ohio, as jurors are 
predisposed to find defendants guilty because they trust police and prosecutors. ‘If the person 
doesn’t take the stand, the jury knows he is guilty,’ Marino said. ‘That’s my experience.’” 
WILLIAM DAWSON, THE LEGAL MATRIX 68 (2008). 
9 Brett, supra note 7. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Radley Balko, Sorry About Your Time on Death Row, Pal, Nothing We Can Do, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/02/sorry-
about-your-time-on-death-row-pal-nothing-we-can-do/.  
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In 2003, the Center for Public Integrity, in a nationwide survey of 
prosecutorial misconduct from 1970 through 2002, reported that five of 
Marino’s convictions had been overturned by Ohio reviewing courts.13 After 
Marino retired in 2002, the reversals kept coming. In 2004, a federal court 
cited ten cases in which Ohio state courts found Marino had engaged in 
prosecutorial misconduct.14 
One of the most notable of Marino’s reversals was the case involving 
Joseph D’Ambrosio, who was convicted of murder in 1989 and sentenced to 
death.15 The Ohio reviewing courts affirmed D’Ambrosio’s conviction and 
sentence,16 and D’Ambrosio’s state post-conviction petition for relief was 
denied.17 In March 2001, D’Ambrosio filed a federal petition for writ of 
habeas corpus based in part on a claim that Marino failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence.18 In 2006, following an evidentiary hearing, a federal 
judge granted the petition based upon findings that D’Ambrosio was denied 
due process by the prosecution’s failure to apprise him of exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence, including evidence that pointed to an alternative 
suspect with a strong motive to kill the victim. The judge ordered the state to 
either dismiss the charges or conduct another trial within 180 days.19 The 
warden appealed.20 In 2008, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that there was 
a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of D’Ambrosio’s trial would 
have been different had the prosecution not suppressed evidence.21 The 
suppressed evidence would have both weakened the prosecution’s case and 
strengthened D’Ambrosio’s position that someone else committed the 
murder.22 
Disputes ensued concerning additional exculpatory evidence not 
previously disclosed to D’Ambrosio’s lawyer. In 2010, after several state 
 
13 CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL 
PROSECUTORS i (2003) [hereinafter CPI].  
14 In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 433 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004). 
15 State v. D’Ambrosio, 652 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1995). 
16 Id. at 712, 716. 
17 State v. D'Ambrosio, No. 75076, 2000 WL 283079, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2000), 
appeal dismissed sua sponte, 731 N.E.2d 1140 (Ohio 2000).  
18 D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, No. 1:00 CV 2521, 2006 WL 1169926, at *10 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 
24, 2006). 
19 Id. at *1. 
20 D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 527 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 2008). 
21 Id. at 499. 
22 Id. 
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court proceedings related to D’Ambrosio’s retrial and other federal court 
proceedings,23 U.S. District Judge Kathleen McDonald O’Malley ordered the 
state not to retry D’Ambrosio.24 She lamented prosecutors’ improper 
withholding of evidence that tended to raise questions of D’Ambrosio’s 
guilt.25 The judge said that the state’s testimony “only can be described as 
‘strain[ing] credulity,’ and showing startling indifference to D’Ambrosio’s 
rights.”26 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed.27 D’Ambrosio was released from prison 
after serving more than twenty years on Ohio’s Death Row.28 His 
subsequently filed federal suit for damages against Cuyahoga County was 
dismissed, although the judge acknowledged the prosecutors “trampled upon 
D’Ambrosio’s constitutional rights.”29 
And the hits keep on coming. In March 2015, Cuyahoga County 
Common Pleas Judge Nancy Russo ordered a new trial for Eugene Johnson, 
Derrick Wheatt, and Laurese Glover, each of whom had spent nearly twenty 
years in prison for a murder in East Cleveland.30 Judge Russo found that 
Marino intentionally withheld a trove of exculpatory evidence in the case, 
and at one point had written a letter to the East Cleveland police department 
ordering department officials to conceal all police reports and other 
 
23 See D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 619 F. Supp. 2d 428, 433–45 (N.D. Ohio 2009); 
D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 688 F. Supp. 2d 709, 713 (N.D. Ohio 2010). 
24 D’Ambrosio, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 735. 
25 Id. at 727. 
26 Id. at 728. The judge also stated:  
For 20 years, the State held D’Ambrosio on death row, despite wrongfully withholding evidence 
that “would have substantially increased a reasonable juror’s doubt of D’Ambrosio’s guilt.” . . . 
[C]ertain of the State’s counsel baselessly attacked the state trial judge, came before this Court and 
supplied testimony that, charitably, only can be described as “strain[ing] credulity,” and showing 
startling indifference to D’Ambrosio’s rights. 
Id. at 727–28. 
27 D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 656 F.3d 379, 390 (6th Cir. 2011). 
28  Regina Brett, Former Death Row Inmate Joe D’Ambrosio, Finally Free, Speaks Out, 
PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.cleveland.com/brett/blog/index.ssf/2012/ 
01/joe_dambrosio_finally_free_spe.html.  
29 D'Ambrosio v. Marino, No. 1:11 CV 933, 2013 WL 256312, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 
2013), aff'd, 747 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 758, 190 L. Ed. 2d 628 
(2014). 
30 Monica Robins, Judge Grants New Trial for 3 Men Imprisoned for Murder, WKYC-TV 
(Mar. 26, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://www.wkyc.com/story/news/local/cuyahoga-county/
2015/03/26/innocence-project-judge-nancy-russo-derrick-wheatt-laurese-glover-eugene-
johnson/70484508//.  
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information relating to the investigation.31 In rendering her decision, Judge 
Russo stated, “Marino is infamous in Cuyahoga County for his vindictive, 
unprofessional and outrageous misconduct in criminal cases.” 32 
Despite this litany of misconduct, the Ohio State Bar has never publicly 
disciplined Carmen Marino.33 
Ohio is not alone. An Arizona man convicted of assaulting police 
officers when resisting arrest was exonerated after excessive force reports 
surfaced, suggesting that the officers may have beaten the twenty-three-year-
old man.34 In California, two defendants who had been convicted of murder 
based on identifications from two witnesses had their convictions overturned 
after one of the defendants uncovered that the police concealed evidence that 
 
31 Opinion on Motion for New Trial at 2, 5, Ohio v. Johnson, CR 95-324431 (Ohio Ct. 
Com. Pl. Mar. 26, 2015), http://cpdocket.cp.cuyahogacounty.us/DisplayImageList.aspx?q 
=wXHMV_TgVTGXBbjf_x30fvRTNBNuueZz0.  
32 Brief of Appellant at 12, Ohio v. Johnson, CR-102828 (Ohio Ct. App. July 1, 2015) 
(quoting Transcript of Trial Court Proceedings from Mar. 26, 2015 at 4), 
http://cpdocket.cp.cuyahogacounty.us/COA_CaseInformation_Summary.aspx?q=KAa3MW
q76t4IB84YpHxuvg2. Judge Russo lamented Marino’s work in office, stating: “[T]he human 
toll that has resulted from [Marino’s] tenure in our county’s office of the prosecutor is 
incalculable and never-ending.” Id. (quoting same at 5).  
33 THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY SERVS., Attorney Information, 
Carmen Michael Marino, http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/AttySvcs/AttyReg/Public_
AttorneyDetails.asp?ID=0001617 (last visited Aug. 18, 2015). Marino is also still listed as an 
active attorney allowed to practice law. Id.  
34 Order Vacating Judgment and Convictions at 4–5, Arizona v. Lewis, CR20120036 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Lewis Order], http://www.gilacountyaz.gov/ 
government/courts/docs/media/FINALVacatingJudgmentConvictions.pdf. In Oct. 2011, 
twenty three-year-old Brandon Lewis was charged with assaulting three police officers in 
Payson, Arizona. Id. at 2. Lewis alleged that the officers said he violently resisted their efforts 
to administer a breathalyzer test. Complaint at 2, Lewis v. Town of Payson, No. CV2012-
00175 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 13, 2012). Lewis was treated for a fractured eye socket, a torn ear 
lobe, and bruises and abrasions to his arms and knees, id. at 3, which the officers said were 
self-inflicted when he slammed his head into the hood of his vehicle. Answer of Town of 
Payson at 6, Lewis v. Town of Payson, No. CV2012-00175 (Gila Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 
2012). Lewis was convicted, but later exonerated after excessive force reports were 
discovered. Lewis Order at 10. The reports, which had been concealed by police, revealed 
inconsistencies with the officers’ testimony, raising the possibility that Lewis did not resist 
and had been severely beaten by the officers. Id. at 5. The reports also contained the names of 
witnesses whose identities had not been disclosed to Lewis’s defense attorney. Id. at 3. In 
vacating Lewis’s conviction in 2013, a Gila County Superior Court Judge declared, “It is an 
injustice that so many important and legally relevant documents were not properly disclosed 
prior to trial.” Id. at 10.  
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a witness had recanted and that law enforcement had paid the witnesses for 
their participation.35 
Illinois has a particularly long and sorry record when it comes to 
prosecutorial misconduct. A murder defendant whose conviction was secured 
in large part by one piece of evidence—a pair of shorts supposedly stained 
with blood consistent with the eight-year-old victim’s type36—was released 
twelve years after his conviction, when he showed that the stain actually was 
paint.37 The prosecutor knew at the time of trial that the stain was not blood.38 
Four men convicted of a 1992 double murder were ultimately exonerated and 
had their convictions vacated after the Illinois Attorney General’s Office 
discovered a prosecutor’s handwritten notes showing that police officers who 
testified against one of the defendants knew the defendant had been in lockup 
 
35 Tennison v. San Francisco, 548 F.3d 1293, 1296, 1298 (9th Cir. 2008). On August 19, 
1989, after a car and foot chase through the streets of San Francisco, California, Roderick 
Shannon was shot to death in the parking lot of a convenience store. Id. at 1296. This occurred 
as public pressure mounted over more than forty gang-related killings that summer. Maurice 
Possley, Antoine Goff, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Jan. 
23, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=
3241. Antoine Goff, 19, and John Tennison, 17, were charged with the murder. Id. No physical 
evidence linked them to the crime. Id. They were convicted in San Francisco County Superior 
Court based upon identifications provided by two young women who said they saw the 
shooting. Id. Tennison was sentenced to twenty five years to life and Goff to twenty seven 
years to life. Id. Both men lost their appeals in the California reviewing courts. Id. Years later, 
in 2003, a federal judge held a hearing on Tennison’s petition for habeas corpus, and 
overturned his conviction based upon what she learned about the original investigation, none 
of which was disclosed to the defense lawyers at the original trial: During the pretrial police 
investigation, one of the girls recanted her identification; she was then given a polygraph, 
which was inconclusive, then put on the telephone with the other girl, and then interviewed by 
the prosecutor, whereupon she reverted to her original identification. Id. The girls were paid 
$2,500. Id. A man told the police he was involved in the shooting, but later recanted. Id. The 
state dismissed the charges, and Goff and Tennison sued the City of San Francisco, which 
settled collectively for $7.5 million. Id.  
36 People v. Miller, 148 N.E.2d 455, 458 (Ill. 1958).  
37 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 5 (1967). In 1955, Miller was convicted and sentenced to 
death for the murder of an eight-year-old girl. Id. at 2. A major item of evidence was a pair of 
shorts found in an abandoned building a mile from the scene of the crime, which contained 
reddish-brown stains. Id. at 6. A chemist for the State Bureau of Crime Identification testified 
the stains were blood, consistent with the girl’s type. Id. at 3–4. It was later determined that 
the prosecutor was aware the stains were paint, not blood. Id. at 5. In 1967, the United States 
Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus, saying, “[t]he prosecution deliberately 
misrepresented the truth.” Id. at 6. Miller was released after serving twelve years. See MICHAEL 
RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 141–52 (1992).  
38 Miller, 386 U.S. at 6. 
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at the time of the murder.39 A man convicted of a 1995 murder and sentenced 
to fifty years was released thirteen years later after showing that the state’s 
attorney’s office knowingly withheld exculpatory evidence.40 
B. SURVEYS AND ARTICLES ILLUSTRATING LACK OF DISCIPLINE OF 
ERRANT PROSECUTORS 
Studies of prosecutorial misconduct in criminal proceedings, many of 
which are cited below in this section, agree that courts rarely discipline 
prosecutors for misconduct. One of the leading sources of information about 
prosecutorial misconduct is Pace University Law School Professor Bennett 
L. Gershman’s text, Professional Misconduct.41 In the first and second 
 
39 Maurice Possley, Daniel Taylor, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., NAT’L REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS (June 24, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/case
detail.aspx?caseid=4212. Daniel Taylor, Deon Patrick, Akia Phillips, and Lewis Gardner were 
indicted and convicted for the 1992 murder of a man and woman in Chicago. Id. All confessed 
to being involved in the crimes. Id. Almost immediately, Taylor repudiated his confession, 
claiming he was in the jail at the time of the murders. Id. Gardner and Phillips were sentenced 
to thirty years in prison, and Patrick and Taylor to life without parole. Id. While post-
conviction proceedings were underway, members of the Illinois Attorney General’s office 
discovered in the State’s Attorney’s files handwritten notes of an assistant state’s attorney, 
which revealed that seven police officers—two of whom had testified at Taylor’s trial—
confirmed that Taylor was in the lockup at the time of the murders. Id. This disclosure 
unraveled the convictions of all four defendants. Id. Eventually, with the concurrence of the 
State’s Attorney, Taylor was judicially exonerated and released in June 2013. Id. Patrick was 
similarly exonerated and released in January 2014, and not long afterward the convictions of 
Gardner and Phillips—who were released on parole in 2007—were vacated and the charges 
dismissed. Id.  
40 People v. Beaman, 890 N.E.2d 500, 502 (Ill. 2008). In 1995, Alan Beaman was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty years in prison in McLean County, Illinois. Id. In 
2008, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the State’s Attorney knowingly withheld 
exculpatory evidence relating to an alternative suspect from Beaman’s defense lawyers. Id. at 
511. After analyzing the facts, the Illinois Supreme Court said:  
We conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been 
different if petitioner had presented the evidence [of] . . . an alternative suspect. We cannot have 
confidence in the verdict finding petitioner guilty of this crime given the tenuous nature of the 
circumstantial evidence against him, along with the nondisclosure of critical evidence that would 
have countered the state’s argument that all other potential suspects had been eliminated from 
consideration. Accordingly, we conclude that the State’s suppression of the withheld evidence 
violated petitioner’s constitutional right to due process under Brady.  
Id. at 514. In 2009, all charges against Beaman were dismissed, and he was released after 
serving thirteen years in prison. Center on Wrongful Convictions, Alan W. Beaman, UNIV. OF 
MICH. LAW SCH., NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Sept. 25, 2014),  
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3018. In 2015 
the Governor granted Beaman’s petition for executive clemency. Id.  
41 BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed.), Westlaw (database 
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editions of the book, which were published fifteen years apart,42 Gershman 
noted that prosecutorial misconduct was an increasing problem.43 Gershman, 
a former prosecutor with the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, has 
authored numerous articles as well as two editions of Professional 
Misconduct on prosecutorial and judicial ethics.44 He attributed the growing 
misconduct problem to prosecutors’ growing powers, and to courts’ failure 
to discipline prosecutors for professional wrongdoing.45 
The costs of prosecutorial misconduct—to the wrongfully convicted 
defendants, to the victims, and to taxpayers—are high. A Chicago Tribune 
study of 11,000 criminal cases between 1963 and 1999 uncovered 381 
homicide convictions that were vacated because prosecutors hid exculpatory 
evidence or allowed witnesses to lie.46 
Prosecutorial misconduct appears to often go unpunished even after it is 
identified. A survey of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in more than 11,000 
 
updated Sept. 2015). Professor Gershman has devoted 600 pages to reported instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct. Id. The book identifies a range of prosecutorial misconduct, from 
wrongdoing in the investigation, to failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, to misusing the 
media, to misconduct in sentencing. Id. §§ 1:1–1:52, 5:1–5:25, 6:1–6:37, 13:1–13:19.  
42 Id. at Preface to Second Edition.  
43 Id. In the first edition of Prosecutorial Misconduct, Professor Gershman summarized 
the state of affairs in three short sentences: “Restraints on prosecutorial misconduct are either 
meaningless or nonexistent. Relatively few judicial or constitutional sanctions exist to penalize 
or deter misconduct; the available sanctions are sparingly used and even when used have not 
proved effective. Misconduct is commonly met with judicial passivity and bar association 
hypocrisy.” BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT ix (1st ed. 1985). 
44 Bennett L. Gershman, PACE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.pace.edu/
faculty/bennett-l-gershman (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
45 GERSHMAN, supra note 41, at Preface to Second Edition (“The prosecutor’s dominance 
in American criminal law, well established when the book was first published in 1985, has 
become even more entrenched. The last fifteen years are most notable for a vast accretion of 
power by prosecutors, increased deference by courts to prosecutorial prerogatives, and a 
general failure of courts and disciplinary bodies to impose meaningful sanctions on 
prosecutors for misconduct.”). 
46 Armstrong & Possley, supra note 2. In January 1999, the Chicago Tribune published a 
series of articles by reporters Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley (co-author of this article), 
titled Trial and Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win. Id. The authors noted: 
The appellate courts denounced the prosecutors’ actions with words like ‘unforgivable,’ 
‘intolerable,’ ‘beyond reprehension,’ and ‘illegal, improper and dishonest.’ At least a dozen of the 
prosecutors were investigated by state agencies charged with policing lawyers for misconduct. . . 
. One was fired, but appealed and was reinstated with back pay. Another received an in-house 
suspension of 30 days. A third prosecutor’s law license was suspended for 59 days, but because of 
other misconduct in the case. Not one received any kind of public sanction from a state lawyer 
disciplinary agency. 
Id. 
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criminal proceedings found 2,000 cases where the appellate courts reduced 
sentences, dismissed charges, or vacated convictions.47 But the courts 
disciplined prosecutors only forty-four times in the cases reviewed.48 A 2010 
USA Today study of Department of Justice (“DOJ”) criminal prosecutions 
found 201 cases where federal prosecutors acted improperly, but in a review 
of bar records could only locate a single instance where a federal prosecutor 
was disbarred in the last twelve years.49 And prosecutors are disciplined less 
frequently than private attorneys.50 
 
47 CPI, supra note 13, at i–ii, 73–100. The survey was conducted by CPI, a national 
organization devoted to investigating and reporting on a wide array of important national 
issues. Id. The study involved national investigations of local prosecutors’ conduct in all types 
of criminal proceedings. Id. A team of twenty one researchers, writers, and editors analyzed 
11,452 state appellate court opinions, trial court rulings, state bar disciplinary filings, and other 
sources back to 1970, in which allegations were made of prosecutorial misconduct in criminal 
cases. Id. The results revealed that individual judges and appellate court panels cited 
prosecutorial misconduct as a factor when dismissing charges, reversing convictions, or 
reducing sentences in more than 2,000 cases. Id. In over 500 other cases, judges stated that 
prosecutorial misconduct was serious enough to merit additional discussion or, in dissent, 
reversal. In many others, judges labeled prosecutorial behavior inappropriate, but upheld 
convictions using the harmless error doctrine. Id. The authors located only thirty four cases in 
which discipline was imposed on the errant prosecutors. Id.; see also CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR 
INTEGRITY, AN EPIDEMIC OF PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT 8 (2013), http://www.prosecutor 
integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/EpidemicofProsecutorMisconduct.pdf (making similar 
findings of a lack of discipline for misconduct despite a high number of instances).  
48 CPI, supra note 13, at 79–80.  
49 Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors’ Conduct Can Tip Justice Scales, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:31 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/ 
2010-09-22-federal-prosecutors-reform_N.htm; see also Harry Mitchell Caldwell, Everybody 
Talks About Prosecutorial Conduct But Nobody Does Anything About It: A 25-Year Survey of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and a Viable Solution (Pepperdine Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2761252. 
50 Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 
755 (2001). Professor Zacharias conducted a study of “all reported cases in which prosecutors 
have been disciplined for violations of professional rules by courts or state disciplinary 
authorities.” Id. at 744. His analysis of the kinds of violations of the rules of professional 
conduct that are applicable to all attorneys, as well as those specifically applicable to 
prosecutors, revealed that “on the whole . . . prosecutors are disciplined rarely, both in the 
abstract and relative to private lawyers. . . . [T]he discrepancy between discipline of 
prosecutors and private attorneys is enormous.” Id. at 755. A reporter for the San Jose Mercury 
News analyzed 1,464 cases summarized in the Bar Journal of California State Bar from 2001 
to 2005, of the most serious categories of discipline—disbarment, probation, and suspension. 
See Mike Zapler, State Bar Ignores Errant Lawyers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 12, 2006, 
5:31 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/taintedtrials/ci_5136869. Of the seventy-five 
criminal cases found, only one involved a prosecutor, while seventy-four involved defense 
lawyers. Id. Additionally, Professor Alschuler wrote:  
5. SULLIVAN FINAL TO PRINTER                                                                                                                                         11/29/2016 6:53 PM  
2015]  DISCIPLINING PROSECUTORS—REFORM PROPOSALS 893 
The entities charged with disciplining prosecutors for misconduct are 
poorly equipped to do so. Even though all states have adopted disciplinary 
rules that forbid prosecutors from suppressing exculpatory evidence or 
falsifying evidence, prosecutors who engage in this proscribed behavior are 
sanctioned infrequently—if at all.51 Bar associations discipline attorneys for 
misusing or abusing client funds but are not equipped to, or do not, review 
prosecutors’ work.52 The DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility 
(“OPR” or “Office”), tasked with overseeing federal prosecutors and other 
agents, began investigations in only 9 percent of the 4,000 complaints filed 
against officials in the last twenty years. Only 4 percent of those were 
determined to have merit, and the Office provided little disclosure about what 
punishments it applied.53 
 
In preparing this article [examining courtroom misconduct of prosecutors and judges], I surveyed 
the reported decisions for the past twenty-five years. Although I uncovered a large number of cases 
in which defense attorneys had been punished for contemptuous courtroom behavior, I did not find 
a single case in which a prosecutor had been so disciplined.  
Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. 
REV. 629, 674 (1972). 
51 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors For Brady Violations: 
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987). Professor Rosen conducted an exhaustive 
search of sources, including every state’s disciplinary body. Id. He concluded: “[D]espite the 
universal adoption by the states of Disciplinary Rules prohibiting prosecutorial suppression of 
exculpatory evidence and falsification of evidence, and despite numerous reported cases 
showing violations of these rules, disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and 
meaningful sanctions rarely applied.” Id. “A prosecutor who suppresses evidence, falsifies 
evidence, or permits a witness to commit perjury too often remains unpunished.” Id. at 742. 
52 JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 181 (2000). The authors, with others of the New 
York City-based Innocence Project, reconstructed sixty-two cases in which convicted 
defendants had been exonerated, often after lengthy prison sentences, with some facing the 
death penalty. Id. at 263–64. They found prosecutorial misconduct involved in many cases, 
including suppression of favorable evidence, knowing use of false testimony, and coerced 
witnesses. Id. at 265. The authors noted the irony in the way states’ disciplinary systems 
functioned:  
Nearly all disciplinary action by bar associations arises from abuse of client funds— typically 
money that was given to an attorney to be held in escrow for a home purchase. In circumstances 
where life and liberty are at stake, though, most state bar associations are ill-equipped to review 
the ethical behavior of prosecutors, and they almost never do so.  
Id. at 181.  
53 See William Moushey, Win at All Costs, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1998, at A1. In 
a series of articles published between November 22 and December 13, 1998, reporter William 
Moushey reported on his examination of over 1,500 cases in which federal agents and 
prosecutors were accused of engaging in misconduct in order to obtain convictions:  
This [Office of Professional Responsibility] within the Justice Department is supposed to oversee 
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The lack of discipline imposed on prosecutors who violate the code of 
professional ethics has been widely observed in legal literature.54 But despite 
this well-known problem, the landscape has not shifted.55 Courts and ethics 
bodies rarely sanction prosecutors, and the rare disciplinary measures tend to 
be mere slaps on the wrist.56 This trend of inaction is consistent even in 
 
the conduct of federal agents and prosecutors, but little oversight is happening. The office opened 
official investigations into only 9 percent of the 4,000 complaints filed against federal law 
enforcement officials during the past 20 years. The office found that only 4 percent of those 
complaints had merit. Since the office only discloses specifics of its investigations on rare 
occasions, it is not clear what punishment was meted out.  
Id. at A-12.  
54 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 50, at 673 (“The legal profession has long contended 
that its lofty ideals are effectuated through a process of rigorous self-policing, but at least in 
the area of prosecutorial misconduct, its pretentions have been totally unfounded.”); Bruce A. 
Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little 
Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 72 (1995) (“[T]he process for sanctioning wrongful 
conduct of federal prosecutors is structurally inadequate.”). “The public record suggests, 
however, that federal prosecutors are rarely, if ever, referred to federal grievance committees.” 
Id. at 83. “Without a doubt, the dearth of reported disciplinary proceedings brought by state 
authorities against federal prosecutors reflects that not only are they rarely reported, but such 
proceedings are also rarely initiated.” Id. at 89. “There are certainly enough authorities—
federal and state, external and internal—overseeing federal prosecutors. Yet, commentators 
have uniformly lamented the lack of effective discipline of prosecutors who violate standards 
of professional conduct.” Id. at 94. See also Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and 
Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 979 (1984) (“Prosecutors’ unethical trial conduct is 
too common and too destructive to ignore. . . . Frequent misconduct by prosecutors is 
subversive to the perception that the American legal profession is capable of self-policing 
professional standards.”). “For too long we have ignored a self-evident fact—unethical 
conduct by prosecutors at trial is seldom dealt with by the grievance process.” Id. at 988. 
55 Michael L. Perlin, “Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed”: Mental Disability, 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, and the Death Penalty 9–10 (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors) (“There is little incentive for prosecutors to reform their ways. There is often 
absolutely no accountability. . . . Even if the misconduct is noticed, the defendant’s conviction 
is still likely to stand. And there is no stigma to the miscreant prosecutor since s/he is virtually 
never mentioned in any subsequent appellate opinion. . . . Although scholars have written 
frequently and persuasively about ethical breaches in such cases (and the need to monitor such 
breaches), their words are generally met with overwhelming indifference.” (endnotes 
omitted)). “In short, prosecutors have virtually carte blanche authority to misinform jurors, to 
play to irrational fears, and to employ unscrupulous experts. And there are virtually no voices 
raised in opposition.” Id. at 15. 
56 See CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, supra note 47, at 8 (“So what happens when 
ethical codes are violated? Nine studies have analyzed the professional consequences of 
prosecutor misconduct. . . . Of the 3,625 instances of misconduct identified, these studies 
reveal that public sanctions are imposed in only 63 cases -- less than 2% of the time[]. Often, 
these sanctions represented only a proverbial ‘slap-of-the-wrist.’ . . . Even in the most 
reprehensible cases, judges typically do not refer the case for disciplinary action and ethics 
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arguably the most egregious cases of prosecutorial misconduct: the 
suppression of exculpatory evidence.57 Alleged misconduct or breaches of 
ethical codes are infrequently reported due to ineffective (or a complete lack 
of) policies and means to gather the information in both state and federal 
courts.58 
In sum, “professional responsibility measures [are] almost always 
ineffective in the prosecutorial misconduct context.”59 As a result, sanctions 
and disciplinary measures have been no real threat to prosecutors.60  
 
boards fail to apply sanctions. Courts rely upon fault-absolving notions like ‘harmless error,’ 
a doctrine that has been termed the ‘lie that the criminal justice system tells itself.’”). 
57 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline 
Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 288 (2004) (“The most common, and in any event the 
most dangerous misconduct is the intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence. Despite 
this well documented and all too recurrent violation of professional responsibility, prosecutors 
who engage in such tactics are rarely, if ever, disciplined.”). 
58 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical 
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 276–77 (2007) (“Even when it [prosecutorial abuse or 
misconduct] is discovered, the legal remedies are ineffective. . . . [R]eferrals of prosecutors 
rarely occur. Even when referrals occur, state bar authorities seldom hold prosecutors 
accountable for misconduct.”). “[T]he state disciplinary process has proven woefully 
inadequate in holding prosecutors accountable for misconduct.” Id. at 282. “Until the rules 
and the disciplinary process are reformed, prosecutors will continue to engage in misconduct 
without consequences.” Id. at 310. See also Michael S. McGinniss, Sending the Message: 
Using Technology to Support Judicial Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to State Disciplinary 
Agencies, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 37 (2013) (“Despite the strong public interest in effectively 
regulating lawyers, neither state nor federal courts have developed adequate policies and 
practices to ensure that lawyers’ misconduct during litigation proceedings is consistently 
reported to state disciplinary agencies.”). “State and federal courts have generally failed to 
adopt rules, or even informal but reliable policies and practices, to ensure that lawyers’ ethical 
violations are consistently reported to disciplinary agencies in the lawyers’ jurisdictions of 
licensure.” Id. at 59. 
59 David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. 
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 213 (2011). “[P]rofessional 
responsibility measures as they are currently composed do a poor job of policing prosecutorial 
misconduct.” Id. at 203. “[P]rosecutors have rarely been subjected to disciplinary action by 
state bar authorities.” Id. at 205. 
60 See Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the 
Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 902 
(1997) (“If the prosecutor’s duty to make the disclosures required by Brady is to be honored, 
it is not fear of disciplinary proceedings before the bar association that will bring this about.”). 
“Brady recognizes a right fundamental to a fair trial. It is simply ignored by all too many 
prosecutors whenever its observance appears to threaten the prospect of a conviction.” Id. at 
933. For more examples of a lack of discipline against prosecutors, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 168 (2011); 
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 2, at 16; Brian P. Barrow, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: Tradition 
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II. ALL JUDGES AND LAWYERS—INCLUDING THEIR LAWYER CLERKS—
HAVE PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO REPORT SERIOUS PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT TO DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES 
As shown above, during the past forty years virtually none of the 
reported cases of prosecutors’ violations of the rules of professional 
conduct—regardless of the subject, severity, and extent of the violation—
have been reported to disciplinary authorities. This is a problem that cries out 
for a cure, which ought to be initiated by those involved on a daily basis in 
the state and federal criminal justice systems—trial and reviewing court 
judges and their lawyer clerks, as well as prosecutors and defense lawyers, 
and the organizations that represent them. The continued failure to report 
prosecutorial misconduct raises questions about the fairness of our systems 
and our ability as a profession to discipline itself. In addition, the non-
 
Pays a Price for the Reduction of Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 301, 327 
(1995); Elizabeth N. Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450, 
1456 (2006); Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial 
Courtroom Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start Prosecuting The Prosecutors?, 19 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 39, 40 (1987); Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games 
Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 565 (2007) [hereinafter Gershman I]; Bennett 
L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 722 (2006) 
[hereinafter Gershman II]; Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys 
to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1062–63 (2009); Peter J. 
Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 829 
(1999); Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute 
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 521 (2011); Randolph N. Jonakait, The 
Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 565 (1987); Peter A. Joy, The 
Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping 
Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403, 427–28 (2006); Jeffrey L. 
Kirchmeier et al., Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1327, 1337–38 (2009); Kozinski, supra note 5, at viii, xxii–xxvii, xxxi–xxxiii, xxxix–
xlii; McGinniss, supra note 58, at 59; Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant 
Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies That Prove 
That Assumption is Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 572 (2011); Richard G. Singer, Forensic 
Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors—and How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227 passim (1968); 
Christopher Slobogin, The Death Penalty in Florida, 1 ELON L. REV. 17, 33 (2009); Lesley E. 
Williams, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3472 (1999); Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, 
25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 913, 919–21 (2012); Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s 
Misbehaving Prosecutors, and the System that Protects Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 
2013, 11:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorial-misconduct-
new-orleans-louisiana_n_3529891.html (“Prosecutors are relied upon to police themselves, 
and it isn't working.”); Bennett L. Gershman, How to Hold Bad Prosecutors Accountable: The 
Case for a Commission on Prosecutorial Misconduct, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 31, 2015), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/31/how-to-hold-bad-prosecutors-
accountable-the-case-for-a-commission-on-prosecutorial-conduct.html. 
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reporting of known breaches of other lawyers’ ethical responsibilities, if 
serious and therefore reportable, has the potential of involving the non-
reporters in separate professional violations. 
A. RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL STATE COURT JUDGES, ALL STATE 
AND FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, AND ALL LAW CLERKS 
The following discussion is based upon the American Bar Association’s 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereafter “Rules” or “Professional 
Rules”), and Model Code of Judicial Conduct (hereafter “Judicial Code” or 
“Code”). With variations as explained in the Appendix, the Professional 
Rules have been adopted by all states except California, and the Judicial Code 
by twenty-nine states. 
The Rules and Code contain well thought-out principles and 
commentary and guidelines for the conduct of judges and lawyers, including 
those employed as state and federal prosecutors and state court judges.61 Here 
are the applicable provisions: 
• Professional Rules.62 Rule 8.3(a) of the Professional Rules, entitled 
“Reporting Professional Misconduct,” provides: “A lawyer who knows that 
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, 
 
61 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY 
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 170 
(1970) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (“‘A judge should utilize his opportunities to criticize and 
correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and counselors, brought to his attention; and, if 
adverse comment is not a sufficient corrective, should send the matter at once to the proper 
investigating and disciplinary authorities.’”) (quoting CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS [AND] 
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 11 (1937)). 
62 Although it has not been definitively determined whether state court judges as lawyers 
are bound by the Professional Rules in addition to the Judicial Code, in this article we assume 
state court judges are not subject to the Rules, because the Code is directed solely to judges, 
while the Rules are directed solely to non-judicial lawyers. Law clerks in federal prosecutor 
offices are bound by the rules of professional conduct in the states where they are licensed. 28 
U.S.C. § 530B (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(a) (2014). Law clerks for federal judges are also bound 
by the rules applicable to judicial employees. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, 
GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, Vol. 2, Pt. A §§ 310.10(a), 310.30, 320 (2013), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/vol02a-ch03pdf. Judicial clerks are also subject to applicable 
rules of professional conduct in the states in which they are licensed. See id. at § 320. Law 
clerks in federal prosecutor offices are bound by the United States Attorneys’ Manual, which 
contains reporting requirements that mirror those of federal prosecutors. UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-4.100 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-1-4000-
standards-conduct#1-4.100 [hereinafter USAM]. 
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trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the 
appropriate professional authority.”63 
• Judicial Code. Rule 2.15 (B) and (D) of the Judicial Code provide: 
(B) A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall 
inform the appropriate authority. . . . (D) A judge who receives information 
indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct shall take appropriate action.64 
Both the Judicial Code and Professional Rules define “knowledge” and 
“knows” as “actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge 
may be inferred from circumstances.”65 Rule 1.0(l) of the Professional Rules 
provides, “‘Substantial’ when used in reference to a degree or extent denotes 
a material matter of clear and weighty importance.”66 
B. RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL FEDERAL JUDGES AND THEIR LAW 
CLERKS 
Federal judges are bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct for United 
States Judges, which has been adopted by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States pursuant to its statutory authority.67 These rules apply to federal 
circuit and district court judges, magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges, and 
the Federal Court of Claims. Canon 3(B)(5) of the code provides: “A judge 
should take appropriate action upon learning of reliable evidence indicating 
the likelihood that a judge’s conduct contravened this Code or a lawyer 
violated applicable rules of professional conduct.”68 The Commentary to this 
rule provides in relevant part: 
Appropriate action may include direct communication with the judge or lawyer, other 
direct action if available, reporting the conduct to the appropriate authorities . . . . 
Appropriate action may also include responding to a subpoena to testify or otherwise 
 
63 PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 8.3(a) (2009) (emphasis added). 
64 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.15(B) and (C) (2010) [hereinafter 
CODE or JUDICIAL CODE] (emphasis added). 
65 RULES r. 1.0(f); CODE, Terminology. 
66 RULES r. 1.0(l). 
67 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (“The Conference may also prescribe and modify rules for the 
exercise of the authority provided in chapter 16 of this title [Complaints Against Judges and 
Judicial Discipline]”). 
68 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(B)(5) (2014).  
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participating in judicial or lawyer disciplinary proceedings; a judge should be candid 
and honest with disciplinary authorities.69 
A federal statute provides that all federal attorneys are subject to the 
same state laws and rules, as well as local federal court rules, that govern 
attorneys in the state where the attorney practices.70 They are also required to 
comply with the reporting requirements of the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual.71 Section 1-4.100 of the Manual provides: “Evidence and non-
frivolous allegations of serious misconduct by Department attorneys that 
relate to the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate, or provide legal 
advice shall be reported to OPR.”72 
C. THE KINDS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT THAT SHOULD BE 
REPORTED 
Prosecutorial misconduct ordinarily comes into play in connection with 
the processing of criminal cases. For example, a prosecutor may violate the 
ethical norms of his practice when coordinating with police and agents who 
are questioning potential witnesses, examining crime scenes, identifying 
suspects, collecting items of evidence, conducting grand jury hearings, 
preparing indictments, dealing with defense lawyers handling pretrial motion 
practice, providing “discovery” of evidence to the defense, negotiating guilty 
pleas, preparing for and participating in bench and jury trials, conducting jury 
selection, making opening statements, introducing prosecution evidence and 
witnesses, cross examining defense witnesses, drafting jury instructions, and 
making closing arguments. Every step of this process presents the potential 
for misconduct by prosecutors. 
In applying the general rules set out above, it is necessary to determine 
what conduct falls within the ambit of the reporting requirements in both the 
Rules and Code, namely, “a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects . . . .”73 The United 
States Attorneys’ Manual uses the word “serious” to trigger reporting to the 
 
69 Id. at Canon 3(B)(5) cmt. 
70 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012). Other statutes include the Jencks Act, which relates to a 
federal prosecutor’s duty to produce prior statements made by government witnesses. 18 
U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). Prosecutors are also subject to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
11 (pleas of guilty) and 16 (discovery obligations). FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 16. 
71 USAM §§ 1-4.100, 1-4.120.  
72 Id. § 1-4.100(B) (emphasis added). 
73 PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 8.3(a); JUDICIAL CODE Cannon 2, Rule 2.15(B). 
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OPR.74 These provisions are phrased in conclusory terms and do not specify 
with precision the kinds of conduct that trigger the reporting. However, some 
guidance is contained in the comments to the Professional Rules:75 
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the failure to report any 
violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a requirement existed in many 
jurisdictions but proved unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to 
those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A 
measure of judgment is, therefore, required in complying with the provisions of this 
Rule. The term “substantial” refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not 
the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. 
The Terminology section of the Professional Rules states: “‘Substantial’ 
when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear 
and weighty importance.”76 Comment 1 to Code Rule 2.15 states in part: 
“This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that an 
independent judiciary must vigorously endeavor to prevent.”77 Even with 
these additional provisions, the lines of demarcation as to reportable conduct 
are imprecise—bright lines are missing—hence the facts and good judgment 
govern application of the rules.78 
In this article we will use the word “serious” to describe reportable 
conduct, although we recognize that this is itself a flexible concept subject to 
interpretation. Seriousness may be measured by the degree of a major 
 
74 USAM § 1-4.100(B). 
75 PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 8.3(a) cmt. 3 (emphasis added); see also id. at cmt. 1 (“Self-
regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary 
investigation [sic] when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. An 
apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary 
investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is 
unlikely to discover the offense.”).  See also Sup. Ct. Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline, Advisory Op. 2016-2 (“A lawyer has a duty to report unprivileged knowledge of 
another lawyer's misconduct under [RULE 8.3].”).  
76 PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 1.0(l).  
77 JUDICIAL CODE Canon 2, Rule 2.15 cmt. 1; see also STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANCTIONS § III.C.6.11 (1992), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
professional_responsibility/corrected_standards_sanctions_may2012_wfootnotes.authcheckd
am.pdf (“Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with intent to deceive the court, 
makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly withholds material 
information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant 
or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.”); id. § III.C.6.12 (noting that 
suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of the same circumstances and takes 
no remedial action).  
78 See Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge’s Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other 
Judges and Lawyers and its Effect on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 769–
71 (1997).  
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individual deviation from accepted professional norms or by the cumulative 
effect of a series of violations or unfair dealings with defense counsel or the 
courts. Triggering events do not involve honest mistakes or good faith errors 
of judgment, because those do not call into question the prosecutor’s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness to be a member of the legal profession, which is 
necessary to triggering the rule’s reporting requirement. 
It is important to bear in mind that the duties imposed on lawyers to 
report serious misconduct to disciplinary authorities are more expansive than 
the test for reversible or harmless error. An example of this distinction may 
be illustrated by the prosecutor’s duty pursuant to the Due Process Clause to 
make pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the defense, as required 
by Brady v. Maryland79 and its progeny, compared to the duties on the same 
subject imposed by the Professional Rules80 and similar codes adopted by 
states. As we observe in Part III.C.1, infra, in most of the reported cases in 
which defendants argued on appeal for reversals and new trials because the 
prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence as required by Brady, 
reviewing courts have held that the failure to produce did not affect the 
outcome of the case and was therefore harmless error. Nevertheless, the 
prosecution’s failure to produce may be reportable to disciplinary authorities, 
pursuant to applicable rules of professional conduct. These reports do not 
focus on whether the conduct is considered grounds for reversal, but rather 
on the seriousness of the prosecutor’s conduct without regard to the outcome 
of the case. The American Bar Association has issued a Formal Opinion 
directed specifically to this point: 
Unlike Model Rules that expressly incorporate a legal standard, Rule 3.8(d) establishes 
an independent one. Courts as well as commentators have recognized that the ethical 
obligation is more demanding than the constitutional obligation. The ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice likewise acknowledge that prosecutors’ ethical duty of disclosure 
extends beyond the constitutional obligation. In particular Rule 3.8(d) is more 
demanding than the constitutional case law, in that it requires the disclosure of evidence 
or information favorable to the defense without regard to the anticipated impact of the 
evidence or information on a trial’s outcome. The rule thereby requires prosecutors to 
steer clear of the constitutional line, erring on the side of caution.81 
 
79 373 U.S. 83 (1963). References in this article to “Brady” include its progeny. 
80 PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 3.8 (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . (d) make timely 
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense[.]”). 
81 ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/2015/May/ 
Conference/Materials/aba_formal_opnion_09_454.pdf; see also discussion in Part III.B.1, 
infra. 
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This same distinction is drawn in case law and the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual, as explained in greater detail in Part III.B.1 below. 
D. THE FAILURE TO REPORT A LAWYER’S SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IS 
ITSELF A VIOLATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL RULES AND THE 
JUDICIAL CODE 
The findings cited in Part I and the many published appellate court 
opinions describing prosecutorial misconduct establish beyond reasonable 
doubt that during the past several decades countless instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct were not reported to disciplinary authorities. It is reasonable to 
assume that many cases involved misconduct that reached the level of 
“seriousness” that triggered an obligation on the part of the lawyers and 
judges who were aware of the misconduct to report promptly to disciplinary 
bodies. In each case, the failure of the lawyer or judge with knowledge to 
report was a separate violation of the rules. 
The National Prosecution Standards, adopted by the National District 
Attorneys Association (NDAA), a national organization of state prosecutors, 
explicitly recognize the risk to prosecutors for not reporting known violations 
by fellow prosecutors of the rules described above.82 The Duty to Report 
Misconduct provides: “A prosecutor’s failure to report known misconduct 
may itself constitute a violation of the prosecutor’s professional duties.”83 
Several state supreme courts have enforced this obligation by imposing 
discipline on non-reporting lawyers. In In re Himmel,84 Illinois lawyer James 
Himmel became aware that his client’s former lawyer, Casey, had embezzled 
funds that were owed to the client.85 The client was worried that any action 
against Casey would delay her recovery of the missing funds. Himmel 
therefore prepared a settlement agreement with Casey and agreed not to 
report him to the Illinois disciplinary authority; in exchange, the client agreed 
to share the proceeds of any recovery with Himmel.86 The Supreme Court of 
Illinois suspended Himmel for one year for his action, saying: “This failure 
to report resulted in interference with the Commission’s investigation of 
 
82 NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.6(d) (3d 
ed. 2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20
Commentary.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS]. 
83 Id. 
84 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).  
85 Id. at 791. 
86 Id. at 792. The report must be made to the Illinois Attorney and Registration 
Disciplinary Commission; reporting to the trial court does not discharge the duty to report.  
Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.E.2d 4, 15 (Ill. 2000).  
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Casey, and thus with the administration of justice . . . . We are particularly 
disturbed by the fact that respondent drafted a settlement agreement with 
Casey rather than report his misconduct.”87 
A similar conclusion was reached in In re Riehlmann,88 which involved 
Louisiana lawyer Michael Riehlmann, who was told by former prosecutor 
Gary Deegan that when Deegan was prosecuting a murder case, he 
intentionally withheld from the defense lawyer a crime lab report that 
exculpated the defendant, who was convicted and sentenced to death.89 
Riehlmann eventually told the defense lawyers and the current prosecutor 
what Deegan said, but he did not inform the Louisiana Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel (ODC) until after Deegan’s death five years later, when Riehlmann 
learned the defendant was about to be executed.90 The Louisiana Supreme 
Court observed that the case presented it “for the first time with an 
opportunity to delineate the scope of an attorney’s duty under rule 8.3 to 
report the professional misconduct of a fellow member of the bar.”91 The 
court found that Riehlmann’s earlier report to the defense lawyers and the 
District Attorney did not fulfill his reporting obligation: “Respondent’s 
knowledge of Mr. Deegan’s conduct was sufficient to impose on him an 
obligation to promptly report Mr. Deegan to the ODC. Having failed in that 
obligation, respondent is himself subject to punishment.”92 
 
87 Id. at 795–96. Commenting on the rule of the Himmel case, an Illinois lawyer wrote: 
“Lawyers may report any ethical violation to an appropriate disciplinary authority but they 
must report only those violations that relate to a lawyer’s honesty and fitness to practice law.” 
Kenneth R. Landis, You May Be Your Brother’s Keeper: When Must You Report Another 
Lawyer’s Misconduct To a Disciplinary Authority? 5 (undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) (emphasis in original). 
88 891 So. 2d 1239 (La. 2003). 
89 Id. at 1241. 
90 Id. at 1242. 
91 Id. at 1246. 
92 Id. at 1249; see also In re Bruno, 956 So. 2d 577, 579, 582–83 (La. 2007) (suspending 
Bruno from practicing law in part for failing to make timely disclosure of a false statement 
made by his co-counsel to a federal district court judge); In re Tolchinsky, 740 So. 2d 109, 
110–11 (La. 1999) (disbarring Tolchinsky for, inter alia, not reporting the improper conduct 
of his employee, a disbarred lawyer); Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Litigation and 
the Duty to Report Misconduct, 1 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 40, 46–47 
(2011) (“With notable examples to the contrary, lawyers are rarely sanctioned for [failure to 
report infractions].”); Diane S. Ciolino, Rule 8.3. Reporting Professional Misconduct: 
Annotations, LOUISIANA LEGAL ETHICS, http://lalegalethics.org/louisiana-rules-of-
professional-conduct/article-8-maintaining-the-integrity-of-the-profession/rule-8-3-reporting
-professional-misconduct/#fnref-360-3 (last updated Feb. 28, 2015) (detailing other instances 
of attorney discipline in Louisiana for failure to report violations). But see D.C. Bar Ass’n, 
Formal Ethics Op. 246: A Lawyer’s Obligation to Report Another Lawyer’s Misconduct, 
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The Supreme Court of South Dakota observed that the same potential 
for violation of the rules applies to members of the judiciary:  
Among the administrative responsibilities imposed on a judge in Canon 3, therefore, is 
that of taking or initiating appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer 
for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware. Thus, a judge 
exposes himself or herself to the disciplinary action for failure to report the misconduct 
of other judges or attorneys to attorney disciplinary bodies and judicial conduct 
commissions.93 
With these rules in mind, we turn to recommendations for the various 
persons and organizations involved in the criminal judicial process. 
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
We submit the following proposals in the hope that the incidence of 
misconduct in criminal cases will decline and that the few prosecutors who 
violate their ethical obligations and blot the profession’s reputation will 
receive appropriate discipline. While this article is directed primarily at 
prosecutorial misconduct, many of the comments and recommendations 
apply equally to defense lawyers. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO TRIAL COURT JUDGES IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 
1. Trial court judges should comply with their obligations to report serious 
lawyer misconduct to disciplinary authorities. 
Trial judges, both state and federal, are on the front line when it comes 
to observing the conduct of the lawyers who appear before them. They 
oversee pretrial discovery including Brady motions, and deal with the trial 
lawyers about witness and evidentiary issues. They handle guilty pleas. They 
conduct bench trials, referee jury trials, and rule on evidentiary issues and the 
objections that inevitably occur during trials. They impose sentences and 
wrestle with all the other myriad matters in the criminal system.94 Over time, 
 
https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion246.cfm (Oct. 18, 1994) 
(holding no duty to report another lawyer’s violation when the knowledge stems from a 
malpractice suit a client wishes to file against the other lawyer). 
93 In re Discipline of Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41, 63–64 (S.D. 2003). 
94 For examples of potential prosecutorial misconduct, see Alschuler, supra note 50, at 
674; Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 410–17 (2001); Gershman II, supra note 60, at 688; Joy, supra 
note 60, at 402–03; Michael Ghetti & Paul Killebrew, With Impunity: The Lack Of 
Accountability Of A Criminal Prosecutor, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 349, 358–60 (2012); Green, 
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trial judges get to know many of the prosecutors and defense lawyers who 
practice before them and learn which ones are inclined to push or cross the 
limits of acceptable behavior. Judge D. Brooks Smith of the Third Circuit 
stated: “The trial court is where issues of prosecutorial misconduct really play 
out. . . . District courts are in a better position [than are appellate courts] to 
ensure that a prosecutor properly fulfills the duties and obligations of his 
office.”95 This obligation is consistent with the court’s obligation to supervise 
professional ethics:  
In reporting disciplinary violations by lawyers, judges would be enforcing the rules for 
which they themselves are responsible. By and large, courts have been jealous of their 
power to regulate the conduct of lawyers in this country and have been unwilling to 
cede this responsibility to legislatures or to administrative bodies. Courts should not be 
able to have it both ways. If they are going to maintain responsibility for rules of 
conduct and their enforcement, then they should be taking the lead in enforcement with 
respect to violations that occur in front of them . . . . They should forward matters for 
investigation when there is an apparent violation even if they are not certain and do not 
have the time or the resources to make a crucial finding of fact.96 
Personal relationships may make it difficult and distasteful to report to 
disciplinary authorities,97 but the serious policy concerns implicated by 
prosecutorial misconduct require action: “Indeed, the silent judge may have 
integrity, but consider the price of the judge’s silence: the unreported 
offensive conduct will continue to infest the legal system. Judges should 
demonstrate the responsibility to take action and thereby protect the court 
system they serve.”98 
 
supra note 54, at 80–81 n.65; Keenan, supra note 59, at 203–04; Rosen, supra note 51, at 734–
35;  Steele, supra note 54, at 970–75; Weeks, supra note 60, at 883–96; Zacharias, supra note 
50, at 724; Note, The Natures and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution 
of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 980 n.165 (1954) [hereinafter Columbia Note]. 
95 D. Brooks Smith, Policing Prosecutors: What Role Can Appellate Courts Play?, 38 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 835–36 (2010) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1303 
(11th Cir. 1998)); see also McGinniss, supra note 58, at 54–55; Judith A. McMorrow et al., 
Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported 
Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1436–37, 1462–64, 1471–72 (2004). 
96 Andrew L. Kaufman, Judicial Ethics: The Less-Often Asked Questions, 64 WASH. L. 
REV. 851, 862 (1989). 
97 Trial court judges in criminal courts are often appointed directly from or after serving 
as prosecutors or defense lawyers, and therefore are dealing with friends, former colleagues, 
and adversaries, resulting in understandable reluctance to instigate disciplinary action. See 
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win. 
Part 5: Break Rules Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/watchdog/chi-020103trial5-story.html. 
98 Abramson, supra note 78, at 780. 
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The materials contained in Part I show that most trial court judges and 
lawyer members of their staffs have remained silent.99 Although attention is 
usually focused on the wrongdoing of prosecutors, trial judges share a portion 
of the blame when trials are not conducted fairly. Written over thirty years 
ago, this remains true today:  
Although the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of our profession’s ethical 
standards is but one scene, it affects the entire play. The judge’s ethical code says that 
judges should be active, but that mandate is ignored. This sets the stage for the 
hypocrisy of the entire production. If self-regulation is to be viable and believable, both 
to the public and to the players themselves, there must be some minimum level of 
honesty and commitment.100 
To a practicing lawyer, the threat of personal discipline, whether before 
a court or separate disciplinary authority, is serious business. The accused 
prosecutor is no longer the aggressor, but rather is on the defensive, in an 
unfamiliar, career-threatening proceeding. He must justify his conduct 
without an immunity shield. The potential consequences are severe—public 
sanction, suspension, disbarment, and/or loss of license and employment. If 
the disciplinary system operates promptly and fairly, it will provide a far 
greater deterrent than reversal of a conviction with the expense of retrial paid 
for by others.101 The example set by disciplinary proceedings also carries a 
powerful ripple effect, a shot across the bow to others who may be tempted 
to stray from a righteous path. 
Accordingly, when attorney misconduct is brought to the attention of a 
trial judge or a judge’s legal staff member, he has an ethical duty to consider 
whether the matter requires that he inform the appropriate disciplinary 
authority or take other action.102 If trial judges comply with the mandatory 
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, they will help get rid of errant 
prosecutors and increase the fairness of the criminal justice system.103 
 
99 See McMorrow et al., supra note 95, at 1435 (“Judges are not a significant source of 
reporting misconduct to the bar disciplinary apparatus.”). “[F]ederal courts relatively rarely 
rely on the state disciplinary system to regulate attorney misconduct in their courts.” Id. at 
1443. 
100 John M. Levy, The Judge’s Role in the Enforcement of Ethics—Fear and Learning in 
the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 116 (1982). 
101 See Barrow, supra note 60, at 329 (“The key feature of all of these methods of discipline 
is that they make the errant prosecutor answerable to a professional body or association that is 
vested with the power to discipline, suspend, or even disbar its members. . . . For the benefit 
of the criminal justice system, the Court must realign its focus to the application of disciplinary 
measures for errant prosecutors[.]”). 
102 Abramson, supra note 78, at 759. 
103 For examples of trial court judges who have complied with this rule, see United States 
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2. When appropriate, trial court judges should use their own powers to 
sanction lawyer misconduct. 
In addition to reporting prosecutorial misconduct to disciplinary 
authorities, state and federal trial court judges have the power to control the 
conduct of lawyers who appear before them, and to impose sanctions on those 
who misbehave. Some of these powers are inherent, and some are derived 
from statutes and court rules. For example, trial judges may hold lawyers in 
contempt for unprofessional conduct that occurs in cases before them.104 This 
is especially important when the misconduct is not deemed serious enough to 
require granting a new trial but the offender should nevertheless be called to 
account. A catalogue of potential disciplinary remedies available to trial 
courts is contained in an opinion of an Eleventh Circuit panel:  
On the matter of professional misconduct of prosecutors, the realities require that we 
defer to our colleagues on the district courts to take the lead. . . . The district courts have 
many potential remedies available: (1) contempt citations; (2) fines; (3) reprimands; (4) 
suspension from the court’s bar; (5) removal or disqualification from office; and (6) 
recommendations to bar associations to take disciplinary action.105 
 
v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 518, 546 (E.D. La. 2012) (sending copy of order to state 
disciplinary board and federal district’s Lawyers Disciplinary Enforcement Committee), aff’d, 
No. 13-31078, 2015 WL 4925029 at *19 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015); United States v. Lane, 577 
F. Supp. 504, 512 n.16 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (reporting prosecutor misconduct “[i]n light of [the 
c]ourt’s duty under . . . Canon 3B(3)”); In re Maurice, 167 B.R. 114, 128 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., 
1994); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics of Iowa State Bar Ass’n. v. Ramey, 512 N.W.2d 569, 571 
(Iowa 1994) (commending trial judge for referring lawyer’s conduct to state ethics 
committee); In re Bruno, 956 So. 2d 577, 578 (La. 2007) (noting that District Court, sitting en 
banc, appointed the U.S. Attorney to investigate Bruno’s conduct); and Denis Slattery, Bronx 
Prosecutor Bashed and Barred from Courtroom for Misconduct, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 
2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-prosecutor-barred-courtroom-
article-1.1746238. 
104 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a); see also GERSHMAN, supra note 41 § 
14:9 (“Although contempt is frequently used to punish defense counsel for misconduct, it is 
rarely used to punish prosecutors.”); Alschuler, supra note 50, at 673–74 (“There is no reason 
why contempt citations could not be used to control prosecutorial conduct in the same way 
that they have been used to control the conduct of defense attorneys and lawyers in civil 
cases.”); Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, passim 
(1971); Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial Courtroom 
Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start Prosecuting the Prosecutors?, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L. 
REV. 39, 58–59 (1987); Green, supra note 54, at 80–81: Kirchmeier et al., supra note 60, at 
1373; Singer, supra note 60, at 276; Zacharias, supra note 50, at 763–64; Columbia Note, 
supra note 94, at 983–84. Contempt may be imposed summarily when the misconduct occurs 
in the judge’s presence; otherwise, a hearing must be conducted. See Ex parte Gordon, 584 
S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979). 
105 United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We thus find 
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3. Trial judges should enter pretrial orders that provide for full compliance 
with prosecutors’ obligations to produce exculpatory evidence, and that 
contain quickly available sanctions for non-compliance. 
Trial court judges may help ensure adherence to the rules of professional 
conduct by requiring in pretrial discovery orders that prosecutors respond 
fully and fairly to discovery requests in accordance with their obligations 
under the Constitution and the applicable rules of professional conduct, and 
by ensuring that known violations will expose prosecutors summarily to 
disciplinary action. 
Trial judges have the power to require prosecutors to make pretrial 
production of evidence that “tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense,” as required by Model Rule 3.8(d).106 This rule imposes 
what may be a distasteful obligation to prosecutors—to provide the defense 
with witnesses and evidence that undermine the prosecution’s case—and 
hence the temptation to grasp for reasons for non-disclosure may be strong. 
The Department of Justice has provided an excellent approach to this subject 
in the Memorandum for Department Prosecutors, January 4, 2010, which 
provides in part: 
Step 3: Making the Disclosures . . . Section 9-5.001 [of the USAM] details the 
Department’s policy regarding the disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment 
information and provides for broader disclosures than required by Brady and Giglio. 
Prosecutors are encouraged to provide discovery broader and more comprehensive 
than the discovery obligations.107 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently explained why the 
prosecution’s discovery obligations should not be measured by the harmless 
error test often used on appeal to determine whether non-production requires 
reversal of convictions: 
Retrospective analysis, while it necessarily comports with appellate review, is wholly 
inapplicable in pretrial prospective determinations . . . . [“T]he due process 
underpinning of Brady-Agurs is a command for disclosure [b]efore an accused has to 
defend himself . . . .” It is impossible for a trial court at the pretrial stage to require “the 
 
ourselves in a situation with which we are all too familiar: a prosecutor has engaged in 
misconduct at trial, but no reversible error has been shown.”). “That we find an error not to be 
reversible does not transmute that error into a virtue. The error is still an error.” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d 731, 737 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
106 PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 3.8(d). 
107 Memorandum for Department Prosecutors from Deputy Att’y Gen. David W. Ogden, 
Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.
gov/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors [hereinafter DOJ Memo] (italicized emphasis 
added).  
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defendant . . . to satisfy the test of materiality normally associated with a retrospective 
Brady-Agurs inquiry, namely, materiality to outcome . . . No one has that gift of 
prophecy.” Therefore, “[t]o argue that the court can apply a material-to-outcome test 
before trial is to argue a contradiction.”108 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO JUDGES WHO SERVE ON 
REVIEWING COURTS 
1. Judges on reviewing courts should comply with their obligations to 
report serious lawyer misconduct to disciplinary authorities. 
Reviewing courts in both the state and federal systems set the rules as 
well as the tone for lawyer conduct. They have an important but largely 
unfulfilled role, indeed a duty, to help prevent the kinds of prosecutorial 
misconduct often disclosed in records on appeal. But regardless of the 
severity of the misconduct, with few exceptions no reports have been made 
to disciplinary bodies.109 In the vast majority of cases, reviewing courts deal 
with alleged prosecutorial misconduct by determining whether it occurred, 
and if so whether it constituted harmless or harmful error, and issue their 
opinions without considering whether the conduct is sufficiently serious to 
require reference to disciplinary authorities. When this occurs, the judges do 
not fully perform their judicial functions.110 As was written over forty years 
 
108 In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 208 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 408 A.2d 
303, 306–07 (D.C. 1979)). 
109 For examples of appellate courts in criminal and civil cases reporting lawyer 
misconduct to disciplinary authorities, see Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1216 (1st 
Cir. 1996); Igo v. Coachmen Indus., 938 F.2d 650, 655, 659 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991); Lewis v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1446, 1459, 1465 
(7th Cir. 1987); Lowenschuss v. Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980); Asphalt Eng’rs, 
Inc. v. Galusha, 770 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 
923 P.2d 395, 396–97 (Haw. 1996); Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 909 P.2d 553, 555, 558 (Haw. 
1995); Cap Rock Elec. Coop. v. Tex. Utils. Elec., 874 S.W.2d 92, 98 n.1, 102–03 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1994); Gonzales v. State, 768 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (directing trial 
judge, pursuant to the Judicial Code, to report prosecutor to state bar); State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 
559, 562, 565–66 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J., concurring) (referring matter to state disciplinary 
authority despite majority’s refusal); State v. Hohman, 420 A.2d 852, 855 (Vt. 1980), 
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Shea, 532 A.2d 571, 572 (Vt. 1987); Covington v. 
Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003); Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d 391, 405 (W. Va. 
1997).  
110 McGinniss, supra note 58, at 59 (“State and federal courts have generally failed to 
adopt rules, or even informed but reliable policies and practices, to ensure that lawyers’ ethical 
violations are consistently reported to disciplinary agencies in the lawyers’ jurisdictions of 
licensure. This deficiency needlessly feeds the perception that courts are unwilling to take the 
steps necessary to secure full accountability of lawyers for their misconduct and thereby 
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ago: “If appellate judges would consistently demand careful and dignified 
trial procedures as a prerequisite to criminal conviction, their concern would 
be effectively communicated to the trial courts.”111 
The duty to report lawyer misconduct does not depend on the outcome 
on appeal, as discussed above in Part II.C. Although prosecutorial 
misconduct may be considered harmless error, it may nevertheless yet violate 
the Professional Rules, because the harmless error doctrine does not set the 
standard for determining whether lawyer misconduct is reportable to 
disciplinary authorities. This distinction was made explicit by the ABA112 and 
cases in which reviewing courts have affirmed convictions and considered 
their obligation to report prosecutorial misconduct.113 The United States 
 
protect the public.”).  
111 Alschuler, supra note 50, at 675; see also Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery 
Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 677 (2013) (“[C]ommon sense and 
experience suggest that the possibility of judicial review encourages compliance with 
discovery obligations. Prosecutors are more likely to take the obligations seriously if 
noncompliance carries a risk of professional discipline or judicial enforcement.”). 
112 ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/2015/May/
Conference/Materials/aba_formal_opnion_09_454.pdf (“Courts as well as commentators 
have recognized that the ethical obligations more demanding than the constitutional 
obligation. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice likewise acknowledges that prosecutors’ 
ethical duty of disclosure extends beyond the constitutional obligation.”). 
113 See United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 264–65 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Kline, 113 
A.3d 202, 213 (D.C. 2015) (“[W]e hold that Rule 3.8(e) [the counterpart to Model Rule 38(d)] 
requires a prosecutor to disclose all potentially exculpatory information in his or her 
possession regardless of whether that information would meet the materiality requirements of 
Bagley, Kyles, and their progeny.”); In re Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 676 (N.D. 2012) (noting 
that conviction in disciplinary proceeding’s underlying criminal case was affirmed on the basis 
of harmless error in spite of finding that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence). 
The Feland Court imposed discipline on the prosecutor, saying:  
A prosecutor’s ethical duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence to the defense does not vary 
depending upon the strength of the other evidence in the case. . . Rule 3.8(d) does not impose a 
materiality element similar to that applied in Brady and [N.D. Rule of Criminal Procedure] 16 . . . 
[A] prosecutor’s ethical obligation to disclose under Rule 3.8(d) is broader than the duty under 
Brady and Rule 16 and our refusal to grant a new trial in [the underlying case] does not preclude 
this disciplinary proceeding[.] 
Id. at 678. “[W]e believe adequate protection of the public, particularly those persons accused 
of a crime, requires that prosecutors not only refrain from intentionally withholding 
exculpatory evidence but that they conform their conduct so they do not knowingly or 
negligently withhold such evidence.” Id. at 80. See also Hohman, 420 A.2d at 855 (“Unethical 
conduct, however worthy of censure, does not necessarily deprive a defendant of a fair trial, 
and is therefore distinguishable from prejudicial error.”); Rosen, supra note 51, at 714 (“An 
ethical violation can, and often will, be present even when due process is not violated.”); 
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 2 at 64–65; Columbia Note, supra note 94, at 977 (“[T]he 
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Attorneys’ Manual emphasizes this distinction.114 
While Judicial Code 2.15 calls upon judges to “inform” disciplinary 
authorities, discussing prosecutorial deviations in opinions does not satisfy 
the rule. For the greatest impact, and to comply with the Judicial Code, the 
communication should come directly from the court to the authority. 
Chastising prosecutors in appellate opinions and even reversing convictions 
for misconduct does not carry the same impact as referral for potential bar 
discipline. The threat of disciplinary action, separate from the decision in the 
case in which misconduct occurred, sends a powerful message not only to the 
lawyer involved who has his reputation and perhaps license at stake, but also 
to others who may be tempted to deviate from appropriate standards of 
conduct.115 
 
attempt to obtain a verdict by improper means requires disciplining of the attorney, who has 
shown that he is not sufficiently aware of the duties of his office. Such a penalty, to be imposed 
regardless of the outcome of the trial and appeal and after a determination of the prosecutor’s 
culpability, should counteract the temptation to gamble on misconduct to obtain favorable 
verdicts.”). 
114 USAM § 9-5.001C (“Disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment beyond that 
which is constitutionally and legally required. . . .[T]his policy requires disclosure by 
prosecutors of information beyond that which is ‘material’ to guilt as articulated in Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), and Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) . . . 1. 
Additional exculpatory information that must be disclosed. A prosecutor must disclose 
information that is inconsistent with any element of any crime charged against the defendant 
or that establishes a recognized affirmative defense, regardless of whether the prosecutor 
believes such information will make the difference between conviction and acquittal of the 
defendant for a charged crime.” (emphasis in original)); see also DOJ Memo, supra note 107 
(“Section 9-5.001 details the Department’s policy regarding the disclosure of exculpatory and 
impeachment information and provides for broader disclosures than required by Brady and 
Giglio. Prosecutors are also encouraged to provide discovery broader and more comprehensive 
than the discovery obligations.”). 
115 Rosen, supra note 51, at 736 (“Reviewing more cases will be an empty gesture unless 
and until prosecutors face serious discipline for suppressing or falsifying evidence.”); 
Slobogin, supra note 60, at 35 (“Reprimand, suspension or disbarment is likely to have much 
more of a deterrent effect on a prosecutor than a reversal or a finding that the prosecutor’s 
error was harmless.”). Many years ago, Professor John M. Levy of Marshall-Wayne School 
of Law made these observations about courts’ teaching role:  
[T]here is a connection between the fact that law students do not identify and articulate ethical 
questions when they are presented with them in actual practice situations and the fact that courts, 
especially appellate courts, do not discuss ethical violations presented by cases before them . . . 
Appellate courts in their written opinions must, sua sponte, set out any serious ethical question 
which the record or the conduct of the lawyers brings to their attention and, moreover, state that 
the question is being referred to the appropriate agency for investigation. 
Levy, supra note 100, at 97; see also Part III.I, infra, concerning law schools. 
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2. Reviewing court judges should include in their opinions the names of 
lawyers who engage in serious or repeated misconduct. 
No matter whether reviewing courts affirm or reverse criminal 
convictions, they should include in their opinions the names of the offending 
lawyers (prosecutors and defense) when the record discloses evidence of 
serious or repeated misconduct, along with a description of the wrongful 
conduct.116 This has been approved in United States v. Hastings,117 in which 
the Supreme Court ruled that when courts of appeal set aside criminal 
convictions because prosecutors engaged in misconduct, an acceptable 
sanction available is “publicly chast[ening] the prosecutor by identifying him 
in its opinion.”118 
Professor Peter J. Henning of Wayne State University Law School 
discussed an opinion of the Ninth Circuit that reversed a criminal conviction 
involving “extensive and continuing prosecutorial misconduct, including 
misrepresentations to the trial court by the Assistant United States 
Attorney.”119 The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to 
consider dismissal due to the severity of the prosecutorial misconduct, but 
without disclosing the Assistant’s name.120 Professor Henning asked 
rhetorically: “Why withhold the identity of a prosecutor the court found had 
essentially lied to the judge and to the defense counsel, and then tried to cover 
up the misconduct?”121 In a recent journal article, Judge Alex Kozinski 
agreed:  
Naming names and taking prosecutors to task for misbehavior can have magical 
qualities in assuring compliance with constitutional rights. . . . Judges who see bad 
behavior by those appearing before them, especially prosecutors who wield great power 
and have greater ethical responsibilities, must hold such misconduct up to the light of 
public scrutiny.122 
 
116 See, e.g., Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015); In re Cook, 49 F.3d 
263, 266–68 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Burse, 531 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 1976); Cap 
Rock Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 874 S.W.2d 92, 98 n.1, 102–03 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1994). 
117 461 U.S. 499 (1986). 
118 Id. at 506 n.5. The court suggested several other disciplinary actions, including 
“directing the District Court to order the prosecutor to show cause,” and “asking the 
Department of Justice to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against him.” Id. 
119 Henning, supra note 60, at 830–31 (citing United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th 
Cir. 1993)). 
120 Id. 
121 Id.; accord RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 2, at 50. 
122 Kozinski, supra note 5, at xxxvi. 
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By adopting this practice, reviewing courts will capture the attention of 
the trial bar, and confirm that the courts are serious about enforcing the rules 
of professional conduct. Judge D. Brooks Smith of the Third Circuit 
pointedly observed:  
I believe that the overwhelming majority of prosecutors would recoil at the notion of 
her or his name being publicly linked to what is, quite plainly, legal wrong-doing. 
Judicial opprobrium directed against a lawyer on ethical grounds is not the stuff of 
which successful careers are normally built—at least not in the prosecutorial realm.123 
Including names of serious offenders in published opinions would also 
enable the creation of a database to receive and store judicial reports of 
criminal litigation-related lawyer misconduct.124 
3. Reviewing courts should use their disciplinary powers in appropriate 
cases. 
We need not repeat the discussion of courts’ contempt powers contained 
above in Part III.A.2. When faced with lawyer misconduct, use of contempt 
by appellate courts was recommended a good many years ago, including 
cases in which the appellate court affirms the trial court:  
When reversal is not warranted, contempt penalties directed specifically against the 
prosecutor may be an appropriate and effective remedy. Such a sanction enables the 
judge to both maintain the integrity and dignity of the court through immediate action 
and ensure that the trial will be free from willful obstruction. Moreover, contempt 
penalties allow the judge to fashion a wide variety of sanctions which are commensurate 
with the severity of the misconduct displayed.125 
Federal reviewing courts may invoke their powers under the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure concerning suspension or disbarment.126 State 
reviewing courts have similar statutory, rule, and inherent authority.127 
 
123 Smith, supra note 95, at 842.  See also Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public 
Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 305 (2016) (evaluating and providing examples of shaming as a deterrent to 
prosecutorial misconduct).  
124 McGinniss, supra note 58, at 74. 
125 Rona Feinberg, The Second Circuit Reacts to Prosecutorial Misconduct, 49 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1245, 1263 (1983); see also United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 1973). 
126 FED. R. APP. P. 46(b), (c); see also In re Bagdade, 334 F.2d 568, 571–72 (7th Cir. 2003); 
In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 267–68 (7th Cir. 1995) (suspending attorney from Circuit bar for two 
years for embezzling client funds from settlement disbursement). See generally Campos v. 
Inv. Mgmt. Props., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (assessing ten times the 
taxable costs upon appellant). 
127 Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United 
States, 2008 J. OF THE PROF. LAW. 359, 380–87. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO FEDERAL AND STATE 
LEGISLATURES AND SUPREME COURTS 
1. The United States Supreme Court, state supreme courts, and legislatures 
should require open file discovery in all felony cases and restrict the 
harmless error rule. 
The proximate cause of much of the prosecutorial misconduct described 
in this article is traceable to the fundamental fault in the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Brady v. Maryland,128 a fault that has been exacerbated by the 
Court’s formulation of the harmless error rule. Grounded upon the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, 
and therefore binding in both federal and state court criminal cases,129 Brady 
requires the prosecution to make pretrial disclosures to the defense of 
evidence in the possession of the prosecution including the police and 
government agencies. The mandatory disclosures are anything that is 
“exculpatory,” “material,” or “favorable to the defense” regarding the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence, or potential penalties to be imposed in the 
event of a conviction.130 It is a prime example of a well-meaning reform gone 
bad, for several reasons: 
 a. The fundamental conflict of interest inherent in the Brady rule. 
The first defect is that in formulating the Brady rule, the Court gave the 
prosecution the discretion to determine, prior to trial, what evidence must be 
produced, even though the defense has the better vantage point to decide what 
is “favorable.”131 The prosecution is thus called upon to make value 
 
128 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
129 Id. at 86. 
130 See id. at 87. The Supreme Court has abandoned the difference in the federal test for 
reversal for non-compliance with Brady based upon whether there was no request, a general 
request, or a specific request made for the exculpatory evidence that was not produced. United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). Some 
form of the Brady rule has been adopted in each state, though these rules are subject to a 
number of exceptions and refinements. GERSHMAN, supra note 41, §§ 5.2–5.22. 
131 Imagine a professional sporting event in which one of the contestants is permitted to 
make the close calls—whether it was a ball or strike, whether the tennis ball was in or out, 
whether the tackle was offside, etc.—without oversight by an independent umpire.  
 As to the prosecutors’ dual, competing roles—to win the case and to see that justice is 
done—Professor Henning has said:  
The prosecutor labors under the pull of two divergent forces created by the ethical precepts. One 
of these forces requires an attorney to advocate passionately the government's position, while the 
other pushes the prosecutor to seek a result that may not be exactly what the client and the attorney 
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judgments that ought to be within the province of the defense lawyer. The 
tests for production—“favorable,” “exculpatory,” “material”—are imprecise 
and value laden, leaving a great deal of room for the exercise of prosecutorial 
judgment. In Brady, the Supreme Court appeared to overlook the obvious 
conflict of interest this doctrine creates between the prosecutor-advocate who 
has confidence in his indictment and wants a conviction, and the defense 
lawyer-advocate, who has an entirely different viewpoint and approach to the 
case, and wants an acquittal. 
Apart from the conflicting interests, in making his determination as to 
production, the prosecutor cannot know the potential uses the defense lawyer 
may have for the evidence. What may not appear useful to the prosecutor 
may be useful for defense counsel. The prosecutor is exposed to the natural 
condition of cognitive bias, which is common to litigators on both sides of 
disputed cases.132 He is convinced in the justice of his indictment. He may 
never have defended a criminal case, and therefore may be unable to put 
himself in the defense lawyer’s position.133 Justice John Paul Stevens, who 
 
desire: a conclusion short of a criminal conviction. Therefore, at the core of a prosecutor's function 
lies a potentially irreconcilable conflict between doing justice—which the ethical codes do not 
define—and the prosecutor's role as the government's primary advocate in the criminal justice 
system. 
Henning, supra note 60, at 727–28. 
132 KATHLEEN “COOKIE” RIDOLFI ET AL., MATERIAL INDIFFERENCE: HOW COURTS ARE 
IMPEDING FAIR DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL CASES 22 (2014), http://www.nacdl.org/report/ 
materialindifference/pdf/.  
 As to prosecutors’ potential cognitive bias and inability to evaluate the importance of 
evidence when seen through the eyes of the defense lawyer, see Kozinski, supra note 5, at 
xxvii (“[I]t’s not in [prosecutors] hearts to help the other side.”); David W. Ogden, Foreword 
to RIDOLFI ET AL., supra, at viii (“[Prosecutors as] advocates pursuing a valid and important 
goal [to convict those they believe are guilty] may tend to view things through a particular 
lens, no matter how hard they try to get their calls right.”).  
 In the opinion of one of the authors, based upon his personal experience as both a former 
U.S. Attorney and as a defense attorney, it is obvious that even the most honorable prosecutors 
have a built-in conflict of interest in deciding what to produce to the defense before trial. This 
opinion is supported by the myriad cases of undisclosed exculpatory evidence in the Registry 
of Exonerations. While withholding the evidence may not be deliberate—after all, many 
prosecutors have never defended a criminal case and will not know what is relevant to the 
defense—the errors from nondisclosure are too costly and is a major reason why defense 
lawyers should have open access to files of prosecutors and law enforcement, subject to certain 
limitations. See discussion regarding open file discovery, infra. 
133 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976). Professor Ridolfi made the same point 
in different words:  
Prosecutors are ill-equipped to apply a post-trial standard to a pre-trial obligation without the 
benefit of the defense perspective and with their natural biases as zealous advocates. . . . Even for 
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was a trial lawyer before being appointed to the bench, pointed out what 
experienced trial lawyers know: “The significance of an item of evidence can 
seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete[.]”134 
b. A decision not to disclose usually means the evidence will never 
become known to the defense lawyer or the courts. 
The second flaw in the Brady rule is that the prosecutor is not required 
to advise the defense lawyer what he has deemed not exculpatory and 
therefore has decided not to produce, nor is he required to seek the advice of 
the court as to his obligation to produce. Accordingly, in the vast majority of 
cases, it is likely that the existence of the evidence in question will never 
become known to the defense or to the courts adjudicating the case.135 
c. If the evidence is discovered after conviction, the harmless error rule 
limits the basis for reversal. 
The final irony of the Brady rule comes into play if, after conviction, the 
prosecutor’s failure to produce exculpatory evidence is disclosed. The 
harmless error rule—a form of which is used in all state and federal courts—
then comes into play. Faced with the prosecutor’s failure to make pretrial 
production of exculpatory evidence, the trial or reviewing court is called upon 
to determine whether, in light of all the evidence, “there is a reasonable 
probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different,” which means “the likelihood of a different result 
is great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
[conviction].”136 The court imagines the trial that should have occurred, with 
the evidence produced to the defense, and compares it to the one that took 
 
the most ethical prosecutor, application of the materiality standard is not done in a vacuum and 
rarely considers the defense perspective—the application is unfairly influenced by the prosecutor’s 
theory of the case, even if inadvertent. 
RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 132, at xv, 22. It is the case that many sources of authority instruct 
prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure. E.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (“[T]he prudent 
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure”); DOJ Memo, supra note 
107. However, these instructions have not taken root in many prosecutorial offices. See 
Kozinski, supra note 5, at viii (noting “an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land”). 
134 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (Stevens, J.). 
135 The National Registry of Exonerations includes cases in which years passed before the 
exculpatory evidence was discovered, although it was known to the prosecutor before trial but 
not produced to the defense. This has led to many exonerations after wrongfully convicted 
defendants have served many years of confinement. See generally UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., 
supra note 6.  
136 Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
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place, with the evidence withheld. The court evaluates the differences 
between the two trials, one real and the other hypothetical, and reaches an 
opinion as to what might have resulted if the prosecutor had produced the 
evidence. The court is invited to ignore the prosecution’s pretrial breach of 
the obligation to produce exculpatory evidence and excuse the prosecutor’s 
failure to make exculpatory evidence available based upon a post-trial record. 
Thus, judges, sworn to uphold the Constitution, are called upon to apply a 
lesser standard of the process due to some defendants compared to others—
that is, the stronger the prosecution’s case compared to the defense, the lesser 
value is attributed to the right of the defendant to a fair trial without regard 
to the relative weight of the evidence. 
 In the great majority of federal and state appellate rulings involving 
allegations about non-production of exculpatory evidence, the reviewing 
courts have held that the alleged Brady violations were harmless error. Justice 
Stevens called attention to the significant difference in the pretrial and post-
trial tests applicable to production of exculpatory evidence:  
[T]here is a significant practical difference between the pretrial decision of the 
prosecutor and the post-trial decision of the judge. Because we are dealing with an 
inevitably imprecise standard, and because the significance of an item of evidence can 
seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the prudent 
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure. But to reiterate a 
critical point, the prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure 
unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.137 
Despite Justice Stevens’ suggestion that “the prudent prosecutor will 
resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure,”138 many commentators 
have concluded that there are prosecutors who have treated the stringent 
after-the-fact “materiality” test as an invitation to narrow their pretrial 
disclosures—to withhold arguably exculpatory evidence at the trial level, in 
the expectation that if the defendant is convicted and the undisclosed 
evidence is discovered, the court will rule that the failure to disclose was 
harmless and therefore not grounds for reversal.139 There is persuasive 
evidence to support this conclusion. For example, in a 2014 study of over 600 
appellate decisions involving alleged violations of the prosecutor’s duty to 
 
137 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107–08 (Stevens, J.). 
138 Id.  
139 See, e.g., Gershman II, supra note 60, at 713 (“[B]y placing the burden of establishing 
the constitutional violation on the defendant, the Court reversed the well-settled rule that 
requires the beneficiary of a constitutional error—i.e., the prosecutor—to demonstrate the 
harmlessness of his violation. By shifting the burden, the Court afforded the prosecutor an 
added perverse incentive to conceal evidence.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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make pretrial production of exculpatory evidence to the defense, the authors 
concluded: 
Taking cues from the way in which courts analyze Brady claims in the post-trial context, 
the prosecutor’s inquiry becomes not whether a piece of information is favorable, but 
instead whether the information would have made a difference in the outcome of the 
case. The judiciary’s almost unilateral focus on materiality conveys a message that non-
material favorable information is unimportant and need not be disclosed. As a result, 
the current system of judicial review fails to promote a culture of compliance, instead 
fostering Brady, or “so-called Brady,” violations.140 
In a 2013 dissent from an order denying a petition for rehearing en banc 
in United States v. Olsen, then-Chief Judge Kozinski, joined by four judges 
on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, concluded that, “Brady violations 
have reached epidemic proportions in recent years, and the federal and state 
reporters bear testament to this unsettling trend.”141 After listing twenty eight 
reported appellate opinions involving breaches between 2003 and 2013, he 
concluded: “When such transgressions are acknowledged yet forgiven by the 
courts, we endorse and invite their repetition.”142 The court “invites 
prosecutors to avert their gaze from exculpatory evidence” by requiring an 
“impossibly high” materiality standard to be met before a conviction will be 
reversed.143 Over the years, a number of legal scholars have called attention 
to this phenomenon.144 
 
140 RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 132, at 44. 
141 United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013). 
142 Id. at 632. 
143 Id. at 633. Judge Kozinski recently elaborated on these remarks, including his 
recommendations that trial court judges “[e]nter Brady compliance orders in every criminal 
case . . . [e]ngage in a Brady colloquy . . . [and a]dopt local rules that require the government 
to comply with its discovery obligations without the need for motions by the defense.” 
Kozinski, supra note 5, at xxxiii–xxxiv (emphasis removed). 
144 See, e.g., Gershman II, supra note 60, at 727–28 (“The development of the Brady rule 
by the judiciary depicts a gradual erosion of Brady: from a prospective obligation on 
prosecutors to make timely disclosure to the defense of materially favorable evidence, to a 
retrospective review by an appellate court into whether the prosecutor’s suppression was 
unduly prejudicial. The erosion of Brady has been accompanied by increasing prosecutorial 
gamesmanship in gambling that violations will not be discovered or, if discovered, will be 
allowed, [as well as] tactics that abet and hide evidence.”); Rosen, supra note 51, at 707–08 
(“As a consequence of the materiality standards, a prosecutor knows that a decision to 
withhold or falsify evidence, even if discovered, will not necessarily result in a reversal of the 
conviction. This is true no matter how flagrant or intentional the prosecutor’s misconduct.”); 
Leonard Sosnov, Brady Reconstructed: An Overdue Expansion of Rights and Remedies, 45 
N.M. L. REV. 171, 190–91 (“Under this constitutional paradigm, police and prosecutors face 
no constitutional pressure to disclose even obviously exculpatory evidence if they believe that 
it will not alter the outcome of the trial. . . . It makes little sense to have a constitutional 
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This potential for conflating the pre- and post-trial tests for production 
was pointed out by the Court of Appeals of New York:  
[A] backward-looking, outcome-oriented standard of review that gives dispositive 
weight to the strength of the People’s case clearly provides diminished incentive for the 
prosecutor, in first responding to discovery requests, thoroughly to review files for 
exculpatory material, or to err on the side of disclosure where exculpatory value is 
debatable.145 
In Olsen, then-Chief Judge Kozinski and his fellow judges pointed out 
another risk caused by using vague terminology to define prosecutors’ 
obligations to produce exculpatory evidence, coupled with forgiving 
appellate “harmless error” review: the likelihood that materials not produced 
at trial will never be discovered, or will come to light after the defendant has 
spent years in prison. The post-trial discovery of a Brady violation is “highly 
unlikely” to be discovered by any party, and “[t]his creates a serious moral 
hazard for those prosecutors who are more interested in winning a conviction 
than serving justice.”146 Another deleterious effect of the harmless error rule, 
as identified by Professor Gershman and relevant to all types of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct, is that it “encourages the view that the courts, by 
condoning prosecutorial lawlessness, are themselves promoting disrespect 
for the law.”147 
Drastic adverse consequences to the fair administration of criminal 
justice have resulted directly from this perversion of the Brady rule. Professor 
Brandon L. Garrett, who analyzed reviewing court opinions upholding the 
convictions of defendants who were convicted, imprisoned, and later 
exonerated, found that thirty eight percent of exonerees in his study had a 
harmless error or “no prejudice” ruling in their post-conviction 
proceedings—or both.148 
A few years ago, Professor Alafair S. Burke analyzed over forty five 
years of Brady-related rulings. He writes:  
 
doctrine that excuses government actors’ intentional withholding of favorable exculpatory or 
impeachment evidence, so long as it is not material.”).  
145 People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1990). 
146 Olsen, 737 F.3d at 630. Other legal scholars agree. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, 
Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 489 (2009) (“If they [prosecutors] 
intentionally suppress evidence that might jeopardize a conviction, they can do so in the 
comfort of knowing there is little chance the evidence will ever come to light and therefore 
only a remote possibility of a challenge to their decision to withhold it.”). 
147 GERSHMAN, supra note 41 § 14:4. 
148 GARRETT, supra note 60, at 201. 
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Much of the blame for Brady’s failure to protect the innocent has been laid at the doors 
of the prosecutors charged with the doctrine’s effectuation. Commentators argue that 
Brady has become a “paper tiger,” frequently and blatantly disregarded by prosecutors 
who have come to realize that they can suppress exculpatory evidence with few 
repercussions other than higher rates of conviction.149 
After analyzing cases dealing with prosecutors’ responding to defense 
demands for production of evidence pursuant to Brady, Professor Burke 
concludes:  
The exonerations of more than two hundred criminal defendants based on post-
conviction DNA evidence have forced an acknowledgement that not only our justice 
system convicts the innocent, but also that prosecutorial suppression of Brady material 
constitutes a leading cause of wrongful convictions. . . . [N]early half of the cases in 
which innocent defendants have been exonerated based on post-conviction DNA 
evidence involved prosecutorial misconduct, and more than a third of the misconduct 
involved the nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence.150 
The problems inherent in the harmless error rule are long standing and 
well known, and are not limited only to breaches of the Brady rule. In the real 
world of criminal prosecutions, reviewing court opinions that call attention 
to prosecutorial violations of established rules but nevertheless affirm 
convictions have little or no deterrent value, and in many instances have had 
the effect of emboldening aggressive prosecutors.151 
Over thirty years ago, in United States v. Hastings,152 a majority of the 
Supreme Court conceded that the prosecutor’s closing argument, in which 
the prosecutor alluded to the defendant’s failure to testify, violated the 
defendant’s constitutional rights,153 but reversed the Seventh Circuit’s order 
for a new trial because the majority was “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error relied upon was harmless.”154 In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined 
by Justice Marshall, made these observations, which are applicable to the 
many cases involving Brady violations that are nevertheless affirmed based 
on harmless error:  
 
149 Burke, supra note 146, at 482–83. 
150 Id. at 509–10.  Professor Burke concludes, as do we, that open file discovery is the 
appropriate requirement for prosecutorial disclosure.  Id. at 518–19. 
151 See United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1984), and United States v. 
Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185 (2d Cir. 1961), for exasperated warnings of appellate court 
judges. See also Gershman II, supra note 60, at 728; Rosen, supra note 51, at 736; Steele supra 
note 54, at 977; Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 285 n.48. 
152 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
153 Id. at 506. 
154 Id. at 512. 
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If Government prosecutors have engaged in a pattern and practice of intentionally 
violating defendants’ constitutional rights, a court of appeals certainly might be justified 
in reversing a conviction, even if the error at issue is harmless, in an effort to deter 
future violations . . . it is certainly arguable that the public’s interest in preserving 
judicial integrity, and in insuring that Government prosecutors, as its agents, refrain 
from intentionally violating defendants’ rights are stronger than its interests in 
upholding the conviction of a particular defendant.155 
 The combination of the Brady rule’s inherent lack of clarity, and 
potential for secret non-disclosure, coupled with the vagaries of the harmless 
error rule when applied to prosecutorial misconduct, have led to a great deal 
of needless and costly litigation, with the results often dependent, as they 
used to say, upon the length of the chancellor’s foot.156 
The system needs change, now. We therefore submit the following 
reforms so that both the Brady and harmless error rules are abandoned or 
substantially reformulated:157 
 • Open file discovery. As to Brady, we recommend that federal and state 
supreme courts and legislatures adopt rules and legislation requiring the 
prosecution to provide open file discovery. “Open file discovery” means 
making available to the defense the prosecutor’s entire file and those of all 
investigative agencies, rather than allowing the prosecution to exercise 
discretion over such disclosures, without the defense counsel’s knowledge or 
court approval. Exceptions to the prosecutor’s duty to disclose may be 
presented by the prosecutor serving a motion on defense counsel that states 
that the prosecutor will present the information he wishes to be protected for 
an in camera inspection by the court without defense counsel present. 
Justifications for non-disclosure include matters that would: endanger 
witnesses from retaliation or intimidation; interfere with ongoing 
investigations; or result in substantial harm to an individual or the public 
interest. 158 
The benefit of open file discovery is that it removes the determination 
of disclosure from the prosecutor after he evaluates each piece of evidence 
 
155 Id. at 527. 
156 See JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock ed., Quaritch 
1927) (1689) (“One Chancellor [has] a long foot, another [a] short foot[,] a third an indifferent 
foot; tis [the] same thing in [a] Chancellor’s Conscience.”). 
157 Whether or not our recommendations are adopted in the federal system, the harmless 
error rule is not binding upon state courts. State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Minn. 1992). 
As to Brady, each state is authorized to call for clearer formulation and stricter enforcement 
of the rules for production of exculpatory evidence at every stage of criminal proceedings. 
People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 919 (N.Y. 1990). 
158 See discussion in Burke, supra note 146, at 516.   
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or information and tests it against local discovery rules as well as Brady and 
its progeny. The process gives a substantial measure of assurance to the trial 
judge and defense lawyer that there has been a good faith effort to provide 
the defense with the government’s complete file.159 
An open file policy is not a panacea because it will still be subject to 
what the prosecutor’s file contains. But it should severely limit the myriad 
disputes that occur in both trial and reviewing courts concerning the 
completeness and fairness of the materials produced by the prosecution, and 
the necessity for retrials when the courts determine there has been inadequate 
disclosure. It will also protect against the scandalous delays in discovery of 
exculpatory evidence until years after the original trial, appeal, and 
imprisonment.160 
• Narrow the harmless error rule. A more stringent formulation of the 
harmless error rule is needed to get the attention of the relatively few 
prosecutors who do not adhere to the principle that their primary duty is to 
see that justice is done, rather than racking up a record of convictions. We 
recommend that if errors occur during criminal trials owing to misconduct of 
law enforcement personnel, including not producing exculpatory evidence, 
new trials should be ordered unless the court is convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error (1) was not due to intentional conduct on the 
part of law enforcement personnel, and (2) did not affect the defendant’s right 
to a fair trial.161 
 
159 For excellent discussions of the need for, and positive results attained from, open-file 
discovery, see Burke, supra note 146, at 515–19; Green, supra note 111, at 622–82; Daniel S. 
Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1557–67 (2010); Robert P. 
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The 
Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 272–76, 306–
09 (2008); Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to 
Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1140–45 
(2004). 
160 One of the authors, a former federal prosecutor, poses the same rhetorical question put 
by Professor Weeks: “What is there, after all, that argues in favor of any limit on disclosure 
by a prosecutor?” Weeks, supra note 60, at 913 (emphasis in original). Why, in criminal cases, 
with freedom and reputations at risk, is pretrial discovery not the same as in civil litigation 
involving disputes about monetary awards? 
161 Similar provisions are contained in the Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, 
a bill introduced by Senator Lisa Murkowski after dismissal of the indictment of Senator Ted 
Stevens. It provides that on appeal, “the reviewing court may not find an error arising from 
conduct not in compliance with this section to be harmless unless the United States 
demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.” Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012) 
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 3014). See Green, supra note 111, at 652–54 (discussing multiple 
5. SULLIVAN FINAL TO PRINTER                                                                                                                                         11/29/2016 6:53 PM  
2015]  DISCIPLINING PROSECUTORS—REFORM PROPOSALS 923 
Further, unless it is clear that the prosecutor’s misconduct was not 
intentional and did not affect the outcome, the court should refer the matter 
to disciplinary authorities, with the transgressor’s name included. These stern 
policies are needed to send clear messages to the few errant prosecutors that 
they must conform their conduct to applicable rules. 
2. Federal and state supreme courts and legislatures should provide that 
prosecutors have qualified rather than absolute immunity from civil 
damage actions. 
Another major impediment to inhibiting prosecutorial misconduct is the 
Supreme Court rule, also adopted by many states, that grants absolute 
immunity to prosecutors from civil damages in suits based upon their conduct 
undertaken in pursuance of their prosecutorial functions.162 The Supreme 
Court adopted this rule in its 1976 decision in Imbler, which held that federal 
and state prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil actions brought 
under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.163 As a result, 
wrongfully convicted and imprisoned defendants—such as in Cleveland, 
Ohio,164 and New Orleans, Louisiana,165 both home to well-documented cases 
of prosecutors’ scandalous behavior and flouting of ethics rules—have no 
civil remedy available against their unscrupulous prosecutors.  
One of the Court’s justifications for this holding is relevant to the subject 
of this article. After pointing out that a prosecutor may be subject to criminal 
prosecution under certain extreme circumstances, the Court added: 
Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could 
deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by 
an association of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the imposition 
of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the 
constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.166 
 
benefits of the legislation); RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 132, at 50–51 (same). 
162 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
163 Id. at 427. Absolute immunity applies when prosecutors “act[] as advocates,” 
performing functions intimately connected with the judicial phase of the criminal proceeding 
and have qualified immunity when they act as “investigators or administrators,” which 
requires that the civil plaintiff must defeat any criminal charges, and prove that the prosecutor 
violated clearly established constitutional law with a culpable state of mind. Johns, supra note 
60, at 521. 
164 See Brett, supra note 7. 
165 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71–72 (2011).  
166 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429. 
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In 2011, in a § 1983 case against a notorious state prosecutor from New 
Orleans, the Court overturned a multi-million dollar verdict for the victim on 
the basis of absolute immunity.167 Justice Clarence Thomas repeated the 
Imbler reference to the prosecutor’s risk of professional discipline as a 
deterrent from abusing his authority.168 
As we have shown in Part I, the Supreme Court assumes the existence 
of a robust disciplinary system, which is not the reality throughout the 
country.169 In the absence of meaningful enforcement of federal and state 
disciplinary systems, as discussed above, there is no monetary sanction to 
dissuade repeat offenders or their employers. But as discussed below, many 
knowledgeable commentators have pointed out that prosecutorial immunity 
from civil liability provides an additional incentive for prosecutors to play 
fast and loose with their ethical obligations. They argue that serious 
consideration should be given to replacing absolute with qualified immunity, 
or alternatively completely eradicating immunity in cases of deliberate 
violations of defendants’ rights. For example, Professor Joseph R. Weeks of 
Oklahoma City University School of Law writes:  
Well considered arguments have been advanced to support the overruling of Imbler. 
Until this occurs, however, the conclusion for our purposes is that the prospect of a civil 
suit under federal law for a Brady violation does not exist. We will have to look 
elsewhere to discover the incentive for prosecutors to comply with their constitutional 
obligations to disclose exculpatory evidence.170 
Judge Kozinski added his support to this reform recently.  He calls 
attention to the justifications for immunity asserted in the Imbler case—that 
 
167 Connick, 563 U.S. at 66–68. 
168 Id. at 66 (“An attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is subject to 
professional discipline, including sanctions, suspension, and disbarment.”). 
169 Zacharias, supra note 50, at 777 (“Imbler v. Pachtman’s reference to the existence of 
professional discipline as grounds for immunizing prosecutors from legal action and 
constitutional review has been repeated in subsequent cases [but] Imbler’s premise is not 
realistic. Bar authorities do not, and probably cannot, fill the void in prosecutorial oversight 
across the board.”). 
170 Weeks, supra note 60, at 877–78; see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The 
Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 
89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2009) (“Standing alone, the disciplinary process will never 
adequately hold errant prosecutors accountable for their role in bringing about wrongful 
convictions. These conclusions belie the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Imbler that 
professional regulation serves as an effective alternative to the civil liability regime. Although 
enforcement can be enhanced, discipline will never come close to playing the lead role in 
constraining prosecutorial misconduct that the Court assigns to it.”). 
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prosecutors are subject to criminal prosecution for their misdeeds, as well as 
discipline for their misconduct.171 Judge Kozinski concludes, and we agree:  
This argument was dubious in 1976 and is absurd today. . . . It is a disparity that can 
only be explained by the fact that prosecutors and judges are all part of the legal 
profession and it’s natural enough to empathize with people who are just like you. If 
the Supreme Court won’t overrule Imbler . . . Congress is free to do so by amending 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.172 
As with the harmless error rule, the federal absolute immunity doctrine 
in § 1983 suits is based upon application of federal law, not constitutional 
principles, and therefore need not be followed in civil actions brought under 
state law. Accordingly, each state may adopt whatever version of immunity, 
or no immunity, shall be given to prosecutors while engaged in their official 
duties. Professor Margaret Z. Johns of the University of California, Davis, 
School of Law, has demonstrated the questionable validity of the historical 
rationale for granting absolute immunity to prosecutors in Imbler, and the 
difficulty in many cases of determining whether absolute or qualified 
immunity applies.173 Following a comprehensive analysis of the subject, she 
has made a straightforward recommendation for an alternative rule—which 
we endorse—for adoption by state courts and legislatures, and by the 
Supreme Court or Congress, of qualified immunity.174 Qualified immunity 
“would protect honest prosecutors from unwarranted litigation while 
 
171 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428–29 (“[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials 
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional 
discipline by an association of his peers.  These checks undermine the argument that the 
imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the 
constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.” (footnotes omitted)). 
172 Kozinski, supra note 5, at xxxix–xli. 
173 Johns, supra note 60, at 521–34.  
174 Id. at 535. See also Williams, supra note 60, at 3471 (“By applying absolute immunity 
to trial-related misconduct, the courts have again immunized prosecutors for behavior that is 
unethical but for which prosecutors are not often subject to disciplinary review.”). “Qualified 
immunity is sufficient to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Qualified immunity 
would continue to protect the well-intentioned prosecutor from liability, but would hold liable 
those who willfully violate federal statutory or constitutional rights.” Id. at 3480. See also 
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 2, at 75 (“As the Supreme Court has noted in other contexts, 
the qualified immunity defense ‘provides ample protection to all.’” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986))). “Qualified immunity protects government officials . . . from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. at 81 (quoting 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).  
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affording victims of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct a remedy for the 
willful violation of their civil rights.”175 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO PROSECUTORS: ADOPT AND 
INSTILL IN THE OFFICE A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AND 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Prosecutors are heavily invested in maintaining public confidence in the 
criminal justice system. They have great credibility; they wear “white hats.” 
It is their responsibility to rid their ranks of those who sully their well-earned 
reputations for honorable dealing. An important recommendation, which we 
wholeheartedly adopt, is the creation of an office “ethical atmosphere”—a 
culture which emphasizes ethical values in hiring and training; provides 
incentives for honorable, open behavior; and disciplines those who do not 
follow the rules.176 In his book Prosecution Complex, Professor Daniel S. 
Medwed concludes that an ethical culture is “key” to increasing the 
likelihood that prosecutors’ offices will carry out justice.177 
 The Prosecution Standards of the National District Attorneys 
Association acknowledges the high ethical standards that bind prosecutors, 
describing the prosecutor’s Primary Responsibility as: “The prosecutor is an 
independent administrator of justice. The primary responsibility of a 
prosecutor is to seek justice, which can only be achieved by the representation 
and presentation of truth.”178 
Written policies, available to the public, are a fundamental starting 
point.179 Continuing education programs are also essential, particularly for 
newly-hired assistants.180 
 
     175 Id.  
176 This has been emphasized by a number of writers. See, e.g., Joy, supra note 60, at 424 
(“Implementing internal policies that value ethical conduct, and implementing and enforcing 
internal discipline when those norms are violated, would go a long way toward addressing the 
issue of prosecutorial misconduct.”).  
177 DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 170 (2011) (“In the end, maintaining an ethical culture within 
prosecutors’ offices is the key to enhancing the likelihood that justice will prevail. . . . Instead 
of emphasizing the black letter of legal doctrine and the techniques of advocacy above all, a 
premium should be placed on ethics and the importance of empathizing with clients as well as 
adversaries.”); see also Medwed, supra note 159, at 1566–67. 
178 NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 82 § 1-1.1. 
179 For example, the U.S. Department of Justice adopted a detailed memorandum for 
Department prosecutors regarding procedures to be followed relating to discovery in criminal 
cases. See DOJ Memo, supra note 107; see also Kirchmeier et al., supra note 60, at 1365–69. 
180 Genson & Martin, supra note 60, at 59 (“It is incumbent upon the office of the 
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Prosecutorial conduct that appears to violate Professional Rule 3.8(f) is 
commonly not sanctioned or even questioned by disciplinary authorities. 
That rule provides that prosecutors in criminal cases shall: 
[E]xcept for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent 
of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain 
from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening 
public condemnation of the accused[.]181 
The violations routinely include “perp walks,” in which defendants, 
most of whom are not flight risks, are paraded in handcuffs as they are led by 
law enforcement officers to the courthouse for fingerprinting and 
arraignment. These media spectacles are often followed by press conferences 
in which grim-faced, self-congratulatory prosecutors outline their evidence 
and depict the defendants in prejudicial terms. Rarely is any mention made 
that the defendants are presumed to be innocent, and that the prosecution has 
the burden of proving the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in 
court.182 Top law enforcement lawyers in both the federal and state systems 
often piously and publicly declaim unproven charges, with no questions 
raised about their apparent violations of the applicable rules of professional 
conduct. 
American Bar Association Formal Opinion 467 deals with the 
responsibilities of supervisory personnel in prosecutors’ offices, including a 
supervisor’s potential vicarious liability for subordinates’ misconduct that 
the supervisor orders, ratifies, or fails to remedy.183 The opinion recommends 
training in the professional rules applicable to prosecutors, as well as staying 
advised of and requiring periodic reports on pending cases.184 Internal office 
discipline does not relieve state and federal prosecutors of their duty to report 
 
prosecutor to implement mandatory continuing education programs designed to educate its 
attorneys about prosecutorial misconduct. Such programs could feature lectures by judges, 
veteran prosecutors, disciplinary authorities, and others active in the field of professional 
responsibility.”). 
181 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(f) (2009); see also id. r. 3.6 (restricting trial 
publicity by both the prosecution and defense). 
182 See, e.g., Rick Rojas, 25 Charged in Heroin Trafficking Ring in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/nyregion/25-charged-in-heroin-
trafficking-ring-in-brooklyn.html?_r=0; Transcript: Justice Department Briefing on 
Blagojevich Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/ 
us/politics/09text-illinois.html?pagewanted=all. 
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evidence of serious lawyer misconduct to local disciplinary authorities, 
pursuant to the rules set out in Part II above. They may be reluctant to report 
friends and colleagues,185 but these professional obligations accompany their 
law licenses and public positions. Prosecutors’ reporting responsibilities are 
set out in the National Prosecution Standards of the National District 
Attorneys Association: 
1-1.6 Duty to Respond to Misconduct: A prosecutor is obligated to respond to 
professional misconduct that has, will, or has the potential to interfere with the proper 
administration of justice: 
. . . 
c. If despite a prosecutor’s best efforts, no action is taken in accordance with the prior 
procedures to remedy the misconduct [by reporting within the prosecutor’s own office, 
see §§ a and b], a prosecutor should report the misconduct to appropriate officials 
outside the prosecutor’s office (to the extent permitted by the law and rules of ethical 
conduct of the state).  
d. A prosecutor’s failure to report known misconduct may itself constitute a violation 
of the prosecutor’s professional duties.186 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO DEFENSE LAWYERS 
As noted in Part II above, defense lawyers are required to report serious 
violations of the Professional Rules by other lawyers, including prosecutors 
and fellow defense lawyers, regardless of how distasteful this may be. And, 
as demonstrated in Part II.D, failure to report when required may itself be a 
violation of the rules. 
In the materials cited in Part I, we have discussed the difficulties many 
defense lawyers have in obtaining full pretrial disclosure from prosecutors. 
There are ways to alleviate this problem. 
 
185 Keenan et al., supra note 59, at 210–11. See generally Steele, supra note 54, at 978–79 
(arguing that it is hard for defense attorneys and judges to report prosecutors due to fear of 
retaliation or other consequences); Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools 
in Addressing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 426 (2011) (same). 
186 NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 82 § 1-1.6. This warning echoes the 
judicial rulings cited in Part II.D above. It is applicable as well to judges, law clerks, and 
defense lawyers who have knowledge of other lawyers’ misconduct. Those who represent the 
accused are an integral part of the criminal justice system. They too have serious ethical and 
professional duties, not only to their clients, but also to the system. They are required and 
expected to comply with their obligations imposed by the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including those relating to candor to the tribunal, fairness to opposing parties and counsel, 
impartiality and decorum to the tribunal, trial publicity truthfulness, and maintaining the 
integrity of the profession. Under Rule 8.3 they must report serious misconduct by both 
prosecutors and fellow defense lawyers. See PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 8.3. 
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First, a pretrial motion asking the trial court to enter an order requiring 
the prosecution to comply with the holdings of the Supreme Court in Brady 
v. Maryland187 and Giglio v. United States could address this problem, as two 
experts have suggested:188 
File a pretrial motion that tracks and cites the relevant ethical rule of the defense 
attorney’s jurisdiction or in the case of federal prosecutors, the rule that applies to the 
state where the prosecutor is based and/or governs the federal proceeding. Ask for an 
order that the prosecutor search her file for information that “tends to negate the guilt 
of the accused or mitigates the offense . . . .” [T]he motion should ask for an order that 
clearly states that “willful and deliberate failure to comply” is punishable by 
contempt.189  
In advancing this idea, Professor Barry Scheck and Judge Nancy Gertner 
point out that this form of motion would create a remedy for defense counsel 
if a prosecutor does something to merit sanctioning, by violating the judge’s 
order.190 
 Second, a recently published article recommends defense lawyers 
request the trial judge to engage in a Brady colloquy even in cases where a 
defendant intends to plead guilty.191 In this scenario: 
[T]he court should ask the prosecutor a handful of questions on the record to investigate 
whether the prosecutor possesses evidence favorable to the defendant that has not been 
disclosed. If the court refuses to propound the questions, the defense attorney should 
offer an affirmation on the record about what material she requested of the prosecutor 
and what, if anything, she received in response. The defense attorney should then invite 
the prosecutor to correct any misstatements about the prosecution’s response to the 
defendant’s Brady request.192 
Professor Jason Kreag concludes that this procedure would increase the 
judge’s role in the prosecution’s disclosure decisions, urge compliance with 
Brady’s mandate, encourage robust defense preparations, and increase the 
likelihood of penalties for prosecutorial wrongdoing.193 He observes that this 
 
187 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
188 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding that promises of leniency made to government 
witnesses must also be disclosed).  
189 Barry Scheck & Nancy Gertner, Combatting Brady Violations With an “Ethical Rule” 
Order for the Disclosure of Favorable Evidence, 37 CHAMPION 40, 40–41 (2013), 
WestlawNext, 37-MAY Champion 40. 
190 Id. at 44. 
191 Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 50–52 (2014).  
192 Id. at 49. 
193 Id. at 50.  
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recommendation “could be implemented today, without passing legislation, 
changing the ethical rules, or giving judges additional authority.”194 
Third, in 2004, the prestigious American College of Trial Lawyers 
(ACTL) made several proposals for amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure relating to pretrial disclosure of favorable information by 
the prosecution to the defense.195 The ACTL recounted the failures of many 
prosecutors to comply with their obligations under the Brady case and its 
counterpart, Rule 16(a)(E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
requires, “[u]pon a defendant’s request,” the production of items within the 
government’s possession that are “material to preparing the defense.”196 The 
ACTL argued that prosecutors had inconsistent interpretations of Rule 
16(a)(E) and Brady, and many failed to produce relevant, helpful 
information, and documents in a timely manner—if at all.197 The ACTL 
called attention to the incongruity in discovery practice between civil and 
criminal rules applicable in many jurisdictions: 
It is anomalous that in civil cases, where generally only money is at stake, access to 
information is assured; while, on the contrary, in criminal cases, where liberty is at 
issue, the defense is provided far less information. More significantly, in civil cases 
violation of the discovery rules is punishable in extreme cases by dismissal; no 
comparable sanction exists in criminal cases.198 
Here we advocate a combination of these three proposals, namely, that 
in both federal and state criminal cases, defense lawyers should present a 
written motion shortly after arraignment requesting an order requiring the 
prosecution to disclose in writing all information favorable to the defendant 
that is known to the prosecutors or to any agents or law enforcement officers. 
Information favorable to the defendant should include all information in 
whatever form—whether admissible or not—that tends to: (1) exculpate the 
defendant; (2) adversely impact the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses 
or evidence; or (3) mitigate the offense or punishment. The motion should 
request that the lead prosecutor certify, in writing, that he: (1) has exercised 
due diligence in locating the requested information; (2) has disclosed all such 
information to the defense; (3) is aware of his continued obligation to disclose 
all requested information; and (4) will seek out and furnish any additional 
 
194 Id. at 56. 
195 American College of Trial Lawyers, Proposal: Proposed Codification of Disclosure of 
Favorable Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 93, 104 (2004) [hereinafter American College]. 
196 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(E).  
197 American College, supra note 195, at 94. 
198 Id. at 104. 
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information favorable to the defense immediately upon it becoming known 
to him. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO STATE AND FEDERAL 
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES 
1. State disciplinary authorities should accept and act promptly upon 
complaints concerning the conduct of lawyers in criminal cases. 
In most states, the primary responsibility for discipline of lawyers is 
vested in a commission, often acting under the state supreme court. The 
Louisiana Chief Disciplinary Counsel observed the importance of the 
disciplinary function to the legal profession:  
Self regulation [sic] is no myth. It is at the core of a viable legal profession. The duty 
to report ethical misconduct rests within the nucleus of that core, often hidden from 
view but as real as are the consequences should we fail; for if we do, “we forfeit that 
trust and have no right to enjoy the privilege of self-regulation or the confidence and 
respect of the public.”199 
But it is clear that during the past four decades, state bar disciplinary 
authorities have not adequately ferreted out and taken action regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct, even in cases in which courts have cited the 
provisions of codes violated, and occasionally publicly identified the 
perpetrators.200 One author put it succinctly: “The lack of oversight and 
accountability for prosecutorial misconduct needs to be addressed by anyone 
interested in remedying prosecutorial misconduct as a factor contributing to 
wrongful convictions. A more proactive approach is needed.”201 
The widespread failure to discipline prosecutors who engage in 
misconduct results in large part from judges and lawyers not reporting 
violations, a shortage of disciplinary agency resources, and administrators’ 
lack of experience with the criminal justice system. An obvious starting point 
 
199 Charles B. Plattsmier, Self Regulation and the Duty to Report Misconduct: Myth or 
Mainstay?, 2007 PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 41, 45 (citing In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 
1249 (La. 2005)). 
200 Davis, supra note 58, at 291 (“The current process has proven totally ineffective in 
sanctioning prosecutors who engage in misconduct.”); Keenan et al., supra note 59, at 245 
(“[T]he ethics rules governing prosecutorial behavior need to be expanded and strengthened, 
and the disciplinary procedures tasked with enforcing them reformed, if our legal system is to 
justifiably rely on professional sanctions to deter prosecutorial misconduct.”); Kirchmeier et 
al., supra note 60, at 1381–85 (introducing five proposals for reform). These articles contain 
thoughtful recommendations for reform of disciplinary processes.  
201 Joy, supra note 60, at 427. 
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toward a solution is adherence by trial and reviewing courts, prosecutors, and 
defense lawyers to the reporting requirements of the applicable rules. But that 
is only a first step. Even when reporting is handled as required by the rules, 
the system will continue to lack relevance to criminal practitioners and the 
judges who handle the cases if the disciplinary agencies do not act promptly. 
The disciplinary process should begin with a careful investigation of the 
facts, which will often be found in the trial or reviewing court record. If 
warranted, written charges should be filed, followed promptly by hearings, 
and imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanctions on those found to be 
knowingly involved in violations of ethical standards.202 It is also important 
that sanctions be reported in bar association and other publications, with the 
offenders’ names and positions disclosed. 
Another recommendation made by several authors, which may already 
be in place in some jurisdictions and with which we concur, is that 
disciplinary authorities review judicial opinions and media for references to 
lawyer misconduct.203 Further, as noted above, there should be in place in 
each jurisdiction a process for publication of the names of those found to have 
transgressed the rules of professional conduct, as well as court-created 
electronic databases to receive and store reports of lawyer misconduct from 
judges.204 
 
202 See Joy, supra note 60, at 424; Rosen, supra note 51, at 736; Zacharias, supra note 50, 
at 771–78. 
203 See Alschuler, supra note 50, at 671; Rosen, supra note 51, at 735–36; Yaroshefsky, 
supra note 57, at 275, 298. 
204 McGinniss, supra note 58, at 37. In its Report and Recommendations on Reporting 
Misconduct, the California Commission On the Fair Administration of Justice stated: “The 
Commission concluded it would also be useful to maintain a county-wide track record, so 
particular offices that may have a high rate of prosecutorial misconduct . . . can be identified.” 
CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
REPORTING MISCONDUCT 14 (2007) [hereinafter CAL. COMMISSION REPORT], 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL%20REPORT%20 
ON%20REPORTING%20MISCONDUCT.pdf. The Commission specified instances of 
reportable misconduct by judges with personal knowledge, including: willful 
misrepresentation to a court, willful and in bad faith withholding or suppressing exculpatory 
evidence which is constitutionally required to be disclosed, and willful presentation of perjured 
testimony. Id. at 26–27. 
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2. Consideration should be given to establishing separate disciplinary 
boards to handle complaints involving the conduct of lawyers in criminal 
cases. 
A number of commentators have suggested that, because many lawyers 
have no experience in the criminal area, separate disciplinary commissions 
be established to handle allegations of attorney misconduct in criminal cases, 
staffed by people experienced in criminal practice, such as retired judges who 
have presided over criminal cases.205 The commission members’ experiences 
would be helpful in understanding the practice of criminal law in the 
jurisdiction, including “the unique web of discretionary decisions by 
prosecutors.”206 
We recommend that this proposal be given serious consideration. 
3. The United States Attorney General should appoint the Office of the 
Inspector General, in place of the Office of Professional Responsibility, to 
investigate and report on allegations of misconduct by federal prosecutors. 
This recommendation is directed to the current federal DOJ disciplinary 
process. We arrived at this conclusion after much consideration, based upon 
the following information and analysis. 
a. The DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility.  
The lawyers who serve in OPR are appointed by the Attorney General. 
Relevant to the subject of this article, OPR’s function is to review and 
investigate allegations of misconduct by Assistant United States Attorneys 
and Criminal Division lawyers that relate to their authority to “investigate, 
litigate or provide legal advice”; to report its findings and conclusions to the 
Attorney General and other appropriate DOJ officials; and to serve as DOJ’s 
contact with state bar disciplinary organizations.207 If OPR finds misconduct, 
the Professional Misconduct Review Unit (PMRU) reviews the file and 
adjudicates the matter.208 If PMRU determines that OPR’s finding is 
supported by the evidence, it makes a disciplinary recommendation.209 There 
 
205 See Davis, supra note 94 at 463–64; see also Kirchmeier, et al., supra note 60, at 1370–
71; Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 296–98. 
206 MEDWED, supra note 177, at 33. 
207 Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Eric Holder to all United States Attorneys, et al., Re: 
Creation of the Prof’l Misconduct Review Unit 2 (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
documents/pmru-creation.pdf. 
208 Established in Jan. 2011 as an additional level of review within DOJ. Id. at 1. 
209 Id. at 2–3. 
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are further appeals provided from PMRU’s decision.210 When the disciplinary 
process is final, OPR notifies state bar associations of misconduct findings 
that have been upheld and that involve the violation of a state bar rule.211 
OPR’s annual reports contain summaries of its investigations, with general 
descriptions of the alleged misconduct, but lack specifics, such as the 
identities of the persons or courts involved, dates, locations, and other factual 
detail.  
b. The DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG).  
During the past several years, criticisms of OPR’s performance have 
come from a number of sources, together with calls for transfer of the 
oversight of prosecutors to OIG. While the OIG is a part of DOJ, it functions 
independently, under the Inspector General Act of 1978.212 OIG is 
responsible for investigating allegations of DOJ employee misconduct, with 
a single exception—misconduct allegations involving federal prosecutors, 
which are handled by OPR.213 This exception has created friction between 
the Attorney General and DOJ’s Inspector General, who for several years has 
requested that jurisdiction over misconduct allegations concerning federal 
 
210 Id. at 3. 
211 This can be and often is a drawn out process, which is terminated if a subject of the 
inquiry leaves government service. A highly publicized example of an extended process 
involves the DOJ lawyers alleged to have engaged in misconduct which led to dismissal of the 
indictment against Senator Ted Stevens. In 2009, OPR found reckless misconduct as to two 
lawyers. Goeke v. Dep’t of Justice, 2015 M.S.P.B. 1, 2 (2015). PMRU concurred and imposed 
15- and 45-day suspensions. Id. at 3. On appeal, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reversed 
PMRU, owing to an improper change of PMRU lawyers during review. Id. at 3–4. In January 
2015, a Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal, and cancelled the 
suspensions. Id. at 15–16. After analyzing the facts and applicable law, the Board stated:  
It may seem at first glance to defy common sense not to subject individuals engaged in what was 
characterized as reckless behavior to disciplinary action, especially when that behavior so publicly 
compromised the justice system with the consequence of interfering with the electoral process. 
However, the fact remains that the Department of Justice voluntarily created and adopted a 
disciplinary process not required by any external law, rule, or regulation, and allowed that process 
to evolve in practice over time. 
Id. at 15. Commenting on this result, Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski released a statement, 
saying: “These two attorneys committed serious misconduct in one of the highest profile cases 
in a generation. When the Justice Department tried to discipline them, it botched its own 
process. This deplorable development undercuts the faith Alaskans may still have in the justice 
system.” Dermot Cole, Murkowski “Aghast” at Rejected Suspensions for Stevens Prosecutors, 
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.adn.com/article/20150115/murkowski-
aghast-rejected-suspensions-stevens-prosecutors. 
212 5 U.S.C. APP. §§ 2, 3 (2012). 
213 Id. § 8E(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. 0.29e(a) (2014). 
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prosecutors be transferred to OIG.214 The Attorney General has opposed the 
change. Here is an abbreviated summary of OIG’s recent public statements 
and writings on the subject: 
The Inspector General appeared before a Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on July 11, 2007.215 His 
written statement216 included a lengthy explanation of OIG’s position, in 
which he noted that, unlike all other OIGs throughout the federal 
government, DOJ’s OIG does not have complete jurisdiction throughout the 
agency.217 This limitation prevents OIG from investigating misconduct 
allegations involving DOJ attorneys’ actions, and instead assigns this 
responsibility to the OPR, an entity that is not statutorily independent and 
reports directly to the Attorney General and his Deputy.218 This creates a 
conflict of interest in OPR, and contravenes the rationale for establishing 
independent Inspectors General.219 OIG operates transparently, while OPR 
operates in secret; OPR’s reports, even when they examine matters of 
significant public interest, are not publicly released.220 OIG has the means 
and expertise to investigate attorneys’ conduct, as is done in all other 
government agencies.221 The current limitation of the DOJ OIG’s jurisdiction 
is inappropriate, violates the spirit of the OIG Act, and should be changed.222 
In the OIG’s December 2013 and November 2014 reports to the 
Attorney General, the IG repeated his objections to the “carve out” of DOJ 
litigators from OIG’s jurisdiction and called upon Congress to eliminate this 
exception from OIG’s investigatory jurisdiction.223 
 
214 Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation’s Inspectors General: Hearing before 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 110th Cong. 27 (2007).  
215 Id. at 12–15 (testimony of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen., United States Dept. of 
Justice). 
216 Id. at 39. 
217 Id. at 50–51. 
218 Id. at 51. 
219 Id. at 14. 
220 Id. at 15. 
221 Id. at 14. 
222 Id. at 15. 
223 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing 
the Department of Justice—2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 10, 2014), 
https://oig.justice.gov/challenges/2014.htm; OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., Top Management 
and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Justice—2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(Dec. 20, 2013), https://oig.justice.gov/challenges/2013.htm. 
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c. The Government Accountability Office (GAO).  
In December 2014, the GAO issued a report entitled Professional 
Misconduct: DOJ Could Strengthen Procedures For Disciplining Its 
Attorneys. GAO explained it issued the report because federal lawmakers had 
inquired about the independence and transparency of DOJ’s misconduct 
review and disciplinary procedures.224 Members of Congress and other 
stakeholders argued that the lack of transparency surrounding DOJ processes 
for investigating misconduct and disciplining prevents attorneys from being 
held publicly accountable.225 Congress mandated in its 2013 fiscal year 
budget for the department that the GAO review and report on prosecutorial 
discipline in the department.226 
The GAO report identifies deficiencies in OPR’s performance, such as 
the time taken to complete investigations and the lack of documentation of 
the final action in several cases.227 GAO’s conclusions include the following: 
“[U]ntil DOJ consistently ensures that all attorneys found to have engaged in 
misconduct are appropriately disciplined, DOJ cannot effectively address 
violations of professional standards.”228 
d. The American Bar Association (ABA).  
In August 2010, the ABA House of Delegates approved a 
recommendation directed to DOJ to (inter alia) make public “as much 
information . . . as possible” from completed investigations.229 A report 
attached to the resolution noted:  
In recent years, however, too little public disclosure has been made regarding OPR’s 
investigations and the DOJ disciplinary determinations predicated on them in cases 
involving alleged professional misconduct. . . . The non-public nature of DOJ’s 
disciplinary determinations deprives the public of information about prosecutors . . . 
who are alleged to have engaged in acts that warrant discipline and about how DOJ 
 
224 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT: DOJ COULD 
STRENGTHEN FOR DISCIPLINING ITS ATTORNEYS 2–3 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/ 
667407.pdf.  
225 Id. at 11. 
226 Id. at 2–3.  
227 Id. at 15, 25–26. 
228 Id. at 37–38. 
229 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION (2010), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/100a.au
thcheckdam.pdf.  
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responds in such cases. . . . [N]ondisclosure is not justified merely because public 
officials might be embarrassed by disclosures.230 
e. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO).  
POGO, a “nonpartisan independent watchdog” organization that for 
several decades has investigated government functions,231 recommended 
improvements and reforms after a review of OPR reports for fiscal years 2002 
through 2013.232 Its report criticized OPR’s failure to make public the names 
of DOJ lawyers who acted improperly, concluding that this insulates OPR 
“from meaningful public scrutiny and accountability,”233 and that such 
secrecy has “fueled suspicions” that DOJ does not aggressively punish 
attorney misconduct.234 POGO noted that even OPR’s longstanding lead 
lawyer said publicly in 2007 that OIG is “a quick and efficient office” and 
that “given the ‘arguable ineffectiveness or limited effectiveness of the 
current [OPR],’ the OIG should take over.”235 POGO called for the DOJ OIG 
to be granted authority to investigate misconduct throughout the department, 
just like all other agency OIGs: “It’s time to end this wrong-headed exception 
and to create more independent oversight of and accountability for DOJ 
attorneys.” 236 
f. Federal courts.  
In United States v. Bowen, Judge Engelhardt of the Eastern District of 
Louisiana questioned the quality of OPR’s investigation of prosecutors’ 
conduct: 
Although in the case of Perricone and now Mann, the usual DOJ protocol appears to 
require simply placing the matter in the hands of the DOJ’s OPR, such a plan at this 
point seems useless. First of all, having the DOJ investigate itself will likely only yield 
a delayed yet unconvincing result in which no confidence can rest. If no wrongdoing is 
uncovered, it will come as a surprise to no one given the conflict of interest existing 
between the investigator and the investigated. Moreover, the Perricone matter has been 
 
230 Id. at REPORT 1–3. 
231 About POGO, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, http://www.pogo.org/about/ (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2015).  
232 PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, HUNDREDS OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ATTORNEYS 
VIOLATED PROFESSIONAL RULES LAWS, OR ETHICAL STANDARDS 2 (2014). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 16.  
235 Id. at 17 (quoting Ari Shapiro, Ex-Chief Calls for Scrapping Justice Dept. Watchdog, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 1, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=10634336. 
236 Id. at 18.  
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under investigation for eight months (since March), and yet it comes as a complete 
surprise to everyone at DOJ and the U.S. Attorney’s Office that another “poster” exists, 
especially one maintaining as high a position in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. It is difficult 
to imagine how this could possibly have been missed by OPR, and surely raises 
concerns about the capabilities and adequacy of DOJ’s investigatory techniques as 
exercised through OPR. In any event, the Court has little confidence that OPR will fully 
investigate and come to conclusions with anywhere near the efficiency and certainty 
offered by suitable court-approved independent counsel. The Court strongly urges DOJ 
to do so post haste. Should DOJ determine not to proceed accordingly, the Court is left 
to proceed as it sees fit.237 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the District Court’s criticism 
of the DOJ’s response to the prosecutor’s misconduct: 
Perricone and Jan Mann both resigned from office with benefits as far as the record 
shows, although they were referred for professional discipline to the State Bar of 
Louisiana. Dobinski remains in federal employment with only a bare reproof for her 
online commenting. Their misdeeds are compounded by the government’s insouciant 
investigation, which leaves open only three inferences concerning this prosecutorial 
breakdown: the government is not serious about controlling extracurricular, 
employment-related online commenting by its officials; the government feared what it 
might uncover by a thorough and timely investigation; or the government’s 
investigation was incompetent.238 
Even the dissenting judge could not help but be appalled at the misconduct.239  
g. Law review articles. 
Scholars’ and experts’ critiques of OPR’s performance have appeared 
in law journals for more than a decade.240 
 
 
237 969 F. Supp. 2d 518, 537 (E.D. La. 2012) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted), 
aff’d, No. 13-31078, 2015 WL 4925029 at *19 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015); accord Kozinski, 
supra note 5, at xxxii (“In my experience, the U. S. Justice Department’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) seems to view its mission as cleaning up the reputation of prosecutors 
who have gotten themselves into trouble.”). 
238 United States v. Bowen, 799 F.3d 336, 358 (5th Cir. 2015).  
239 Id. at 365 (“The government attorneys acted deplorably in this case, and their 
punishment has been unconscionably mild.”). 
240 See Davis, supra note 58, at 294–96; Green, supra note 54, at 85–87; Bruce A. Green, 
Regulating Federal Prosecutors: Let There Be Light, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 156, 157–
60 (1996); Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 421–22 (1996); Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for 
Professional Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 
1083, 1109–11 (1994); Williams, supra note 60, at 3474–75; Zacharias & Green, supra note 
170, at 16 n.75. 
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h. Conclusion. 
In light of the above, we agree that there exists an appearance that 
lawyers who serve in OPR and the PMRU are neither independent nor 
unbiased, and therefore should not be responsible for oversight of the conduct 
of federal prosecutors. We take this position being aware that the appearance 
may not reflect reality. But whatever the facts, OPR lawyers are obviously 
saddled with the appearance of conflicts of interest. In contrast, the IG 
functions without those conflicts, and has a reputation for independence.241 
Accordingly, we recommend that Congress or the Attorney General take 
the necessary steps to delegate to the OIG the responsibility for investigating 
and reporting on allegations of misconduct by federal prosecutors, as 
embodied in a recently-introduced bill to amend the Inspector General Act of 
1978.242  
G. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO FEDERAL AND STATE 
ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PROMULGATE CODES OF PROFESSIONAL 
AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
This recommendation is addressed to the federal and state supreme 
courts, and other entities that recommend and draft rules relating to judicial 
and lawyer conduct. To insure that all lawyers and judges, state and federal, 
are required to report their knowledge of serious lawyer misconduct, we 
recommend and urge that, to the extent necessary, the applicable codes be 
written to mandate the reporting of serious lawyer misconduct to disciplinary 
authorities as follows: 
(1) For state court lawyers and federal prosecutors. We recommend that 
every state supreme court that has not already done so243 adopt the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 8.3 as written, with the 
mandatory “shall.” 
(2) For state court judges. We recommend that every state supreme court 
that has not already done so244 adopt the Model Revised Judicial Code with 
the mandatory word “shall.” 
 
241 This is dramatically illustrated by the Inspector General’s repeated, direct 
confrontations with the Attorney General over replacing OPR with OIG to investigate federal 
prosecutors. See supra notes 214–222 and accompanying text. 
242 Inspector General Access Act of 2015, S. 618, 114th Cong. (2015) (eliminating a 
provision of the original Act that requires referral of allegations of misconduct involving DOJ 
personnel to the OPR, thus allowing the DOJ IG to investigate those allegations). 
243 See Appendix, § 1, infra, for a list of these states. 
244 See Appendix, § 2, infra, for a list of these states. 
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(3) For federal judges. We recommend the Federal Judicial Conference 
provide for mandatory reporting to both the Department of Justice and the 
local state disciplinary body. We use the word “mandatory” to ensure that 
reporting be required rather than permissive. We believe it best if the 
Conference uses Judicial Code Rule 2.15245 as written for all federal courts. 
(4) Several commentators have recommended the creation of specific 
ethical rules for prosecutors that reflect their unique role as both advocates 
and seekers of justice.246 Prosecutors have broad discretion whether to 
prosecute, and are often faced with difficult choices regarding whether to 
indict or decline prosecution, especially in cases that achieve public notoriety 
or those in which evidence of guilt does not reach the standard of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. Suggestions for the formulation of standards with 
greater specificity, and clearer ethical rules, are contained in several 
thoughtful law review articles.247 We recommend they be given serious 
consideration by national and state supreme courts and bar associations. 
H. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 
ORGANIZATIONS THAT REPRESENT JUDGES, PROSECUTORS, AND 
DEFENSE LAWYERS 
This recommendation is directed to organizations, state and federal, 
local and national, that represent prosecutors, defense lawyers, bar 
disciplinary bodies, and the profession in general.248 These highly-respected 
organizations are well-positioned to advocate for cultures of integrity, for the 
adoption of written policies, and for compliance with the Professional Rules 
and Judicial Code. Their publications and training should emphasize the 
responsibilities of prosecutors and defense lawyers—line assistants as well 
as supervisors—to comply with the standards of the legal profession, and the 
obligation to report to disciplinary authorities when they become aware of 
serious misconduct on the part of their peers. 
 
245 JUDICIAL CODE Canon 2, r. 2.15(B).  
246 Joy supra note 60, at 418–420; Williams, supra note 60, at 3478–79. 
247 E.g., Joy supra note 60, at 418–420; Williams, supra note 60, at 3478–79.  
248 To name a few examples: the American Bar Association, state bar associations, the 
National Center for State Courts, the Federal Bar Association, the National Bar Association, 
the National Organization of Bar Counsel, the National District Attorneys Association, the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the American Judicature Society. 
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I. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO LAW SCHOOLS 
In many areas, especially in populous cities, the criminal practice is 
divided between lawyers who handle “white collar” cases for wealthy 
corporations and individuals (or lesser offenses for their relations) who are 
able to pay substantial hourly rates, and those who serve in public defender 
offices representing indigent defendants, who make up the population of 
most criminal defendants.249 Accordingly, we have included 
recommendations directed to the nation’s law schools. We concur with 
Professor John M. Levy’s statement from years ago: 
The significance of teaching professional responsibility in law school should be more 
than merely to enlarge the meaning of “thinking like a lawyer” to include the ability to 
spot and analyze ethical issues. In educating students to be professionals, the law school 
has an impact on how the person will ultimately behave in that role.250  
Lara A. Bazelon, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, has 
written a provocative article about the value of law school clinics to prepare 
students for criminal practice.251 She includes thought-provoking examples 
of lawyer misconduct in criminal cases, and the dilemmas posed by the rules 
that require reporting professional misconduct.252 In the article, Professor 
Bazelon argues that a significant portion of misconduct in criminal cases is 
the product of poor or negligible training, especially in the intricacies of the 
practice of criminal law.253 Her discussion calls to mind the remarks of Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting in Connick v. Thompson: “One can qualify 
for admission to the profession with no showing of even passing knowledge 
of criminal law and procedure.”254 The Justice was referring to the situation 
in Louisiana, but the remark undoubtedly applies to other states as well. 
 
249 See, e.g., CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000) 
(reporting that, in 1996, 82% of felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties were 
represented by public defenders or appointed counsel). 
250 Levy, supra note 100, at 99. In 2007, the California Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice recommended “that law school courses in legal ethics and continuing 
ethics education programs in legal ethics for prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges include 
familiarity with the obligations to report misconduct and incompetent representation by 
lawyers . . . to the California State Bar.” CAL. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 204, at 29. In 
1970, an ABA Special Committee recommended: “The individual attorney’s responsibility to 
report instances of misconduct as a necessary element of the self-policing privilege should be 
stressed in law school so that it is impressed on the lawyer during his formative years.” ABA 
REPORT, supra note 61 at 169. 
251 Bazelon, supra note 185. 
252 Id. at 392–94, 398 n.9, 400–03. 
253 Id. at 408–25. 
254 563 U.S. 51, 107 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Professor Bazelon provided the following additional statement, with 
which we agree: 
While it is true that prosecutor and defender offices have a responsibility to train and 
continue to educate their lawyers, it is equally true that they deserve newly-minted 
graduates who are thoroughly familiar with the applicable legal and ethical rules. 
Familiarity does not mean a rote recitation of the applicable standards, but rather an 
ability to apply the standards in [the] real world of high stakes practice. The argument 
that law schools owe their students this kind of hands-on training has gained more force 
in recent years, as the economic downt[ur]n has produced a glut of J.D.s in search of 
jobs. Positions for new lawyers in federal and state prosecutor and defender offices are 
becoming increasingly difficult to obtain in this era of austerity. I believe it is incumbent 
upon all law schools to provide education that not only teaches the substance of the law, 
but also introduces students to the kinds of skills [required for] the actual practice of 
law and a real world knowledge of the applicable rules of professional ethics. Those 
skills are essential to [students’] ability to get decently paying jobs, and more 
importantly, to do those jobs with competence and integrity. I therefore recommend that 
the Association of American Law Schools, and other similar organizations, add to their 
agendas teaching substantive and procedural criminal law, and the thorny ethical issues 
that often arise in that practice.255 
CONCLUSION 
Prosecutorial deviations from ethical standards have continued to result 
in reversals of criminal convictions.256 Nevertheless, we firmly believe the 
vast majority of prosecutors are ethical women and men who strive to achieve 
justice. At the same time, we are dismayed at the small number of reported 
incidents in which prosecutors, both state and federal, have been cited for 
straying from the high standards of professional conduct imposed on them—
those who are elected or appointed to enforce the law. We cannot fathom why 
 
255 Email from Lara A. Bazelon, Director, Loyola Project for the Innocent, Loyola Law 
School, Los Angeles, to Thomas P. Sullivan, Jenner & Block, Chicago, and Maurice Possley 
(March 1, 2015) (on file with authors); see also MEDWED, supra note 177, at 33–34.  
256 E.g., Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016) (per curiam) (non-disclosure of evidence 
favorable to defendant); United States v. Dvorin, No. 15-10142, 2016 WL 1085744, at *10 
(5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2016) (non-disclosure of evidence favorable to defendant; knowing use of 
false testimony; reckless disregard of duties; vindictive prosecution); Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 
F.3d 1106, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2015) (improper closing argument); United States v. Mahaffy, 
693 F.3d 113, 127–34 (2d Cir. 2012) (non-disclosure of evidence favorable to defendants); 
Betancourt v. Warden, 2016 WL 490285 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2016) (non-disclosure of 
evidence favorable to defendant); McCoy v. Delaware, 112 A.3d 239, 266 (Del. 2015) 
(improper cross examination of defendant); Starling v. Delaware, 130 A.3d 316 (Del. 2015) 
(improper conduct during trial and in closing argument); Wright v. State, 67 A.3d 972, 994 
(Del. 2014) (non-disclosure of evidence favorable to defendant); Cardona v. Florida, 185 So. 
3d 514 (Fla. 2016) (improper cross examination and closing argument); Evans v. Florida, 177 
So. 3d 1219, 1230–39 (Fla. 2015) (improper closing arguments); Crew v. Florida, 146 So. 3d 
101, 107–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (improper closing arguments).  
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so many withhold exculpatory information, tamper with witnesses and 
evidence, engage in improper courtroom conduct, and the like, only to, claim 
that their failures were “harmless error” and therefore of no real or lasting 
consequence when challenged. The very opposite is true: whether a 
conviction is undone or not, the consequence is palpable—it is a stain on the 
reputation of the entire legal profession. 
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APPENDIX  
THE STATUS OF LAWYER AND JUDGE 
REPORTING RULES IN THE 50 STATES 
1. Rules on lawyer reporting obligations.  
All states except California have adopted the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Of those states that have adopted the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, all but two states have retained the word 
“shall” in describing lawyers’ duty to report misconduct by other lawyers. 
Georgia and Washington have substituted “should” for “shall.”  
California has a single, narrow statutory provision on lawyers reporting 
misconduct by lawyers. The California Business and Professions Code § 
6068 provides that lawyers have a duty to self-report to the agency charged 
with attorney discipline, in writing, within thirty days of the time the attorney 
has knowledge of the reversal of a civil judgment against him based in whole 
or in part upon misconduct, grossly incompetent representation, or willful 
misrepresentation. 
2. Rules on judicial reporting obligations. 
As to judges, twenty nine states have adopted amendments based upon 
the Revised Judicial Code. Most of these states have provisions regarding the 
judicial reporting of lawyer misconduct that are substantially similar to 
Model Rule 2.15. States that have not amended their codes of judicial conduct 
based on the Revised Judicial Code also have provisions regarding the 
judicial response to either misconduct or “unprofessional conduct” by a 
lawyer. The relevant provisions in the codes of judicial conduct for some of 
these states are substantially similar to the obligation contained in Model 
Rule 2.15. 
Although the judicial codes of all states have provisions regarding the 
judicial response to misconduct or “unprofessional conduct” by a lawyer, not 
all states require a judge to report misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary 
authority. The states that do not impose this requirement can be placed into 
two categories: 
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(2) States whose code of judicial conduct has mandatory language, but 
has other language in the same provision that does not require reporting to a 
particular or “appropriate” disciplinary body. Most give judges discretion to 








Along with its judicial code, California also has a provision in its 
Professions Code, § 6086.7, that requires courts to notify the State Bar of 
orders of contempt against lawyers; when a judgment is modified or reversed 
based on lawyer misconduct, incompetence or willful misrepresentation; or 
when certain sanctions are imposed against a lawyer. 
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